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Center for Information System Security Defense Information Systems Security Program

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PREFACE

The Defense Information Systems Security Program is a joint undertaking of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and the National Security Agency (NSA). This document was prepared by the Architecture and Engineering Directorate of the DISA Center for Information System Security. The Architecture and Engineering Directorate is located at the NSA and comments on this document may be delivered to:

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