Day 165 - 27 Sep 95 - Page 17
1 was because it would be oppressive, that evidence of things
2 happening on another occasion would not really go to what
3 happened in the particular dispute that was the subject of
4 the action.
5
6 MR. JUSTICE BELL: You refer me to -- do we have 1895 1 Chancery
7 334?
8
9 MR. MORRIS: We do not have a spare.
10
11 MR. JUSTICE BELL: Again I have that. So you just read me the
12 parts. I will make a note if you give me the page and
13 letter numbers and refer to the parts you want.
14
15 MS. STEEL: I think this is Lord Herschell, Lord Chancellor --
16 is that what "LC" stands for?
17
18 MR. JUSTICE BELL: Yes, it is.
19
20 MS. STEEL: On page 338: "In my opinion, these interrogatories
21 are not such that the answers to them would be relevant to
22 the issue. Suppose the Defendant says: 'I did enter into
23 such and such transactions at such and such dates on such
24 and such terms', would that be relevant to the issue, what
25 were the terms on which this property was purchased? Could
26 the truth of his statement be tried in this action? Could
27 the Plaintiff say: 'I will show you that Carswell and the
28 Defendant purchased 20 properties on certain terms before
29 1873, and that they purchased 10 properties on the same
30 terms afterwards'? Would the Judge be bound to try the
31 question on what terms all these properties were purchased
32 for the purpose of determining the terms upon which the
33 property involved in this action was purchased?
34
35 No doubt there are cases in which evidence of what happened
36 in one transaction may be relevant to the question what
37 happened in another. I do not dispute that general
38 proposition. In the present case the suggestion is this,
39 that if it can be proved that in a number of prior
40 transactions Carswell and the Defendant had been purchasing
41 land on partnership terms, that would render it probable
42 that such was the nature of this transaction also. But
43 that is not relevant evidence. Cases of this description
44 are not determined upon probabilities, but upon evidence of
45 what happened upon the particular occasion."
46
47 I would say that that is different to our case because what
48 we are doing is testing the strength of the evidence rather
49 than making the decision of the whole case.
50
51 MR. JUSTICE BELL: Yes, I think what might be said against you
52 is that one has really got to draw the line somewhere.
53 I do not mind saying that in this case we have had an awful
54 lot of evidence on matters which are, arguably, relevant
55 but are so peripheral that they probably will not help me
56 at all at the end of the day.
57
58 So, one has to try to be careful to limit the amount of
59 material which is of peripheral reference. I have been
60 slow to exclude it if all the parties have been content
