Day 177 - 26 Oct 95 - Page 17
1 page 2 that I have copied. (Handed)
2
3 Then the final thing I have done is to make rather a rough
4 -- rough in the sense that it is stapled together and not
5 beautifully copied on both sides -- a facsimile of the
6 original of the leaflet complained of. I will come to that
7 in due course, but I would hand it in now, if I may.
8 (Handed)
9
10 Can I start then -- I promise that will be as short a tour
11 as possible -- with the authorities, starting with Gatley,
12 but not in the order -- I have handed in the page order,
13 but I would rather, if I may, start in a slightly different
14 order. Can I start at paragraph 93, which is on page 48?
15
16 MR. JUSTICE BELL: Yes.
17
18 MR. RAMPTON: "Natural and ordinary meaning. Words are normally
19 construed in their natural and ordinary meaning,
20 i.e., in the meaning in which reasonable men of
21 ordinary intelligence, with the ordinary man's
22 general knowledge and experience of worldly
23 affairs would be likely to understand them. The
24 natural and ordinary meaning may also include
25 any implication or inference which a reasonable
26 reader guided not by any special but only by
27 general knowledge and not fettered by any strict
28 legal rules of construction would draw from the
29 words."
30
31 That is taken from Lord Morison's opinion in
32 Jones v. Skelton. Then Gatley goes on:
33
34 "The words are not to be construed in a milder
35 sense merely because they are capable on some
36 forced construction of being interpreted in an
37 innocent sense."
38
39 It is put like that, I think, because if one looks at
40 footnote 71, it used to be held, though long since dead,
41 that that was the approach, but it is no longer.
42
43 Then there is, perhaps not for your Lordship's education
44 but because it is important in a case of this kind where
45 one is asking the judge or a judge who is going to decide
46 the meaning of the case after having sat and listened to
47 the bulk of the evidence on a particular topic over a
48 period of weeks or months, the distinction between the
49 natural and ordinary meaning and the legal innuendo is an
50 important one.
51
52 It is all set out in 94 and 95 of Gatley. I do not propose
53 to read it out. What I would do, if I may, is summarise it
54 in this way: the natural and ordinary meaning is either
55 the literal meaning of the words complained of or any
56 natural inference or implication which, as a matter of
57 ordinary language and ordinary knowledge, the words may be
58 held to bear, or both.
59
60 MS. STEEL: I am having a bit of trouble getting all this
