Day 307 - 27 Nov 96 - Page 14
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2 MS. STEEL: I think a mere lawyer does not, but the point is an
3 ordinary member of the public does.
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5 MR. JUSTICE BELL: I think an ordinary member of the public
6 would think they are all the same thing.
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8 MS. STEEL: The point is, an ordinary member of the public
9 would read the press release to be saying that we,
10 personally, were distributing it and, therefore, it must be
11 up to McDonald's to prove that we personally were
12 distributing it.
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14 MR. JUSTICE BELL: I do not think it is any more serious that
15 you actually hand it out or cause it or procure it or be
16 party to it in some way. It is all the same thing, at the
17 end of the day.
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19 MS. STEEL: But that is not a question of meaning. The
20 question is: What meaning would the ordinary member of the
21 public take from this press release? They would take the
22 meaning that we, personally, had distributed it.
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24 MR. JUSTICE BELL: Yes. I am not sure I agree with you about
25 that. But I do not think it makes any difference at the
26 end of the day.
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28 MS. STEEL: In any event, the effect of that is, we say, that
29 the Plaintiffs' meaning (a) is not the natural and ordinary
30 meaning of the press releases and leaflets for the reason
31 that it includes recklessness and because it is not solely
32 about distribution or publication by ourselves.
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34 MR. RAMPTON: I wonder if I might say something at this stage?
35 I think the case your Lordship was referring to was
36 Lucas Box. The effect of that is that the so-called
37 meaning which the Defendant, or, in this case, Defendant to
38 counterclaim, pleads is the sense in which he says that the
39 sting or charge made by the words complained of is true.
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41 MR. JUSTICE BELL: Yes.
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43 MR. RAMPTON: He does not plead what he says the ordinary
44 person would necessarily infer.
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46 MR. JUSTICE BELL: At the end of the day, I do not think it
47 makes any difference, does it, so far as the case is
48 concerned?
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50 MR. RAMPTON: No. I mean, if the sting which the defendant is
51 able to justify is sufficient to meet the charge conveyed
52 by the words complained of, that is a sufficient defence,
53 though it may not have the same literal meaning as the
54 original words.
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56 MS. STEEL: I understand that, but the point is that we are
57 currently arguing about what the meaning is of the
58 leaflet. I mean, the point is, the meaning is that we
59 distributed the leaflet. If the Plaintiffs then want to
60 try and justify that by saying it does not really matter