The Court commented adversely on a previous decision34 denying the possibility of such review in security cases, and opined that the appropriate test was an objective one: the satisfaction of the President (acting on ministerial advice) had to be objectively reasonable, and it was not sufficient that the minister genuinely believed himself satisfied. However, the actual ratio of the case was that there was no actual evidence of presidential satisfaction. As a result, habeas corpus was granted and the detainees released. However, quite cynically, the Government arranged for their rearrest outside the detention centre on freshly prepared documentation which complied with the Court's ruling. If the court had framed the ratio of the case more generally, this would not have been possible.
Legislation was then passed restoring the previous law, excluding the relevance of the case-law of any other jurisdiction,35 and denying an appeal to the Privy Council in security cases.36
The smartness of these laws goes even further. The appeal to the Privy Council could of course be abolished at any time, but has been retained because it encourages inward investment. However, the appeal requires agreement between the parties at any time before the case goes to the Singapore Court of Appeal, and is not allowed in security cases and cases involving professional discipline. Thus important commercial cases can still go the Privy Council and be decided by English judges in London, but cases involving the Government can be filtered out simply by the expedient of the Government refusing to agree to the appeal, thus allowing the case to be determined finally by the Singaporean judiciary. The competence and independence of the judges need not be in issue: if their decisions are not sufficiently smart, they can be reversed by exercise of legislative power, and if this requires a constitutional amendment, the Constitution also ensures that the two-thirds requisite majority is always forthcoming.