

# Bluesniff - The Next Wardriving Frontier

#### Bruce Potter <gdead@shmoo.com> Brian Caswell <bmc@shmoo.com>

XIII / I / MMIII

DefCon XI



### **Bluetooth Basics**

- NOT 802.11! NOT a relative of 802.11!
- Cable replacement technology
  - Low power for embedded devices
- More BT radios than 802.11 radios in existence
  - Phones, headsets, laptops, mice, keyboards
- Master / Slave architecture



#### **Bluetooth Protocol**

- Uses 2.4 GHz ISM band, same as 802.11b/g
- Generally low power
  - Class 3 (1mW) for most devices
  - Some Class 1(100mW) devices exist
- Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum
  - Uses a pre-defined hopping pattern
    - Back in the day, FHSS was a "security" mechanism
  - Resists interference
  - 1MHz wide, hopping every 625 microseconds



### **Bluetooth Protocol**

- A real disaster of a protocol stack
  Heck, the core spec is 1024 pages.. Good reading!
- Specifies from Layer 1 to Layer 7
- High points
  - RF-level sync
  - Inquiry/request
  - Service discovery
  - Low power modes



# **Bluetooth Security**

- Pairing
  - Using a shared secret (PIN), exchange random number to form key
  - Key used to derive session key for future comms
  - Used for Trusted <-> Trusted comms



# **Bluetooth Security**

- Authentication / Authorization
  - Per connection AA
  - Per service AA
- Encryption
  - Ditto
- It's all OPTIONAL!
  - Left to the developer/user to decide
    - This ends well... :(

XIII / I / MMIII

DefCon XI



# **Bluetooth Profiles**

- Profiles exist to ease interoperability \*wink\* \*wink\*
- Keyboard, file transfer, handsfree (and headset), etc...



#### Bluetooth vs. 802.11b

- More at stake
  - Compromise 802.11 security = Access to network
  - Compromise BT Security = Gateway directly to App level functionality
- More personalized information
  - Phone conversations, calendar info, etc
  - Less interesting for Joe 12-pack, more interesting for executives



# Discovery of 802.11

- Direct Sequence Spread spectrum
- Transmitters always in the same "place" in a channel
  - DSSS pretty easy to find
  - Granted, transmitters may be on different channels
    - Cisco hardware channel switching RF Monitor
    - Prism 2 firmware channel switching RF Monitor
    - Orinoco need external channel hopper



# Discovery of 802.11

- Beacons
  - "I'm here" every 100ms
  - Can be turned off for "cloaking"
    - Fools Netstumbler
    - Doesn't fool Kismet or Airsnort
- Regular traffic
  - Windows boxen are noisy
  - Regardless of OS, generally frequent traffic



# **Discovery of Bluetooth**

- FHSS harder to "find"
  - Must align with hopping pattern
  - BT uses 1/2 the normal hop time to Jump Around
  - Still averages 2.5 to 10 secs to find known device
- Devices can be Discoverable
  - Respond to inquiry requests



# **Discovery of Bluetooth**

- Devices can also be non-discoverable
  Must be directly probed by MAC addr
- Little to no traffic for extended periods of time (esp in low power mode)
  - Cannot easily be listened to b/c receiver cannot sync on hopping pattern
- Sophisticated RF gear can find and intercept traffic
  - Currently no one can make a standard card do this



#### **Bluetooth Attacks**

- Interception of traffic during pairing
  - Brute force guess the PIN to recover key
  - Know the PIN b/c it's imbedded
- More likely poorly developed software
  In BT, security is "optional"
- Or simply bad defaults
  - File sharing with no AA/E in discoverable mode was the DEFAULT for my BT driver on my PDA
  - Just like the early days of 802.11b



# **Bluetooth Tracking**

- Even Class 3 devices can be intercepted at a distance
- If your phone/PDA/earpiece is BT enabled, attacker can follow you using commodity gear

- Like your own RFID tag



## **Bluetooth Wardriving**

- Used to walk around hitting "scan" button on BT driver UI
- Does not find non-discoverable devices
- Needs new tools to catch on
- Same voyeuristic appeal of 802.11 wardriving
- As it becomes popular, BT developers and users will get a swift kick in the butt to make things more secure



# Redfang

- Released by @Stake, Spring 2003
- Looks for devices that do not want to be discovered
  - Brute forces through MAC addresses attempting to find devices
    - First 3 octets fixed, rotates through last three
  - Can take a long time, since FHSS sync can take ~10 seconds per MAC
  - The only way so far...



### Bluesniff

- http://bluesniff.shmoo.com/
- Our tool (heh.. he said tool...)
- Focused on providing a UI
  - Front-end for Redfang
  - Also finds devices in discoverable mode
    - Yes, people leave things to be discovered
- Making BT wardrivers easier and more efficient will raise awareness of BT security issues

#### The Shmoo



XIII / I / MMIII

DefCon XI

20	<b>e</b> ir			
Bluet	ooth Scanner	0,1	Mon Jul 14 15:49:50 20	)03
Grou <mark>Bluet</mark> File	ooth Scanner Record Scan ices Norma Address Brute	0.1 I Scan n Force Scan n Device Name Version Class Class Signal Strength <esc> to cano <tab> to mo</tab></esc>	Mon Jul 14 15:49:50 20 First Seen Manufacturer Features Features Link Quality cel the drop-down menu ove among the widgets	)03
		VENTER> to vie Use arro	w details of the device ws for scrolling	

The Shmoo

5-20-



XIII / I / MMIII

DefCon XI

#### The Shmoo





#### Future work

- Integration with WiFi scanning tools (namely Airsnort)
- New scanning methods