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$Unique_ID{bob00325}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Japan
Chapter 1D.   World War II}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Rinn-Sup Shinn}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{japan
japanese
united
states
government
war
party
japan's
occupation
national
see
pictures
see
figures
}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Title:       Japan
Book:        Japan, A Country Study
Author:      Rinn-Sup Shinn
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 1D.   World War II

     Impressive victories at the beginning of the war seemed to confirm the
expedience of the Japanese army's aggressive policies. The naval and air
forces of the United States were largely immobilized by the attack on Pearl
Harbor, except for main aircraft carrier units. Western strongholds from Hong
Kong to Burma quickly fell, and by mid-1942 Japanese might was supreme in the
western Pacific (see fig. 2).

     The Tojo cabinet tightened controls on the nation and its overseas
territories, suppressing all opposition and what remained of civil rights. The
Imperial Diet lost any remaining partisan character, and prominent zaibatsu
members were appointed to high government posts concerned with centralized
economic controls. In most former European colonies that came under Japanese
rule, indigenous movements were sponsored, but they produced little friendship
for Japan. On the contrary, harsh Japanese exploitation and administration
engendered hatred and bitterness in most areas.

     The initial military successes evoked patriotic fervor in Japan, and the
Tojo cabinet, despite its dictatorial methods, enjoyed popular support. The
military reverses that began with the loss of Guadalcanal in February 1943
made it evident that the military had miscalculated the strength of United
States forces, but there was little public knowledge of this misjudgment
because of tight press censorship. In November 1943, as United States military
pressure increased, the Tojo government attempted further centralization of
administrative and economic power.

     A major turning point in the war was the loss of Saipan in July 1944; the
loss brought the Saipan-based United States bombers within range of Tokyo. The
resulting heavy air raids shocked the nation, forcing Tojo to resign soon
afterward. His successor, General Koiso Kuniaki, was charged with maintaining
the war effort while being prepared to open negotiations for a compromise if
peace appeared possible. But heavy bombing of the Japanese islands and the
landing by United States forces in Okinawa, the largest island of the Ryukyu
chain, caused the fall of the Koiso cabinet in April 1945. Admiral Suzuki
Kantaro, the new prime minister, was of the group that favored negotiation
rather than a fight to the death. And yet the new government was unprepared to
accept the unconditional surrender terms issued by the Allied powers in July
1945. Known as the Potsdam Declaration, these terms in essence called for
occupation of Japan, laying down of arms by Japanese forces, dismantling of
Japan's economic potential for war, and democratization of the Japanese
political system. On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb used in the history
of warfare was dropped on Hiroshima, and the second one was dropped on
Nagasaki August 9. On August 8 the Soviet Union had declared war against
Japan.

     Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 14 after an
unsuccessful effort to modify them in order to preserve the special position
of the emperor. The decision involved the active, and possibly the decisive,
participation of the emperor who took an unprecedented step by himself
announcing the decision to the Japanese by radio the same day. His message
that the Japanese must accept total surrender and "endure the unendurable" was
accepted and carried out without demur. In addition to the power of the
imperial utterance and the tradition of obedience to authority, psychological
shock and physical weariness contributed to docile acceptance of surrender and
foreign military occupation. The militarism of the 1930s and 1940s had
collapsed.

     Costs of defeat in human and physical terms were enormous. Japan lost
Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, the Ryukyus, Bonins, southern Sakhalin, the Kurils,
and the League of Nations-mandated Micronesian territories in the Pacific.
Thirty percent of the Japanese were left homeless. Over 2.3 million soldiers
were killed or wounded in the years after 1937, and there were 800,000
civilian casualties. Most major cities except Kyoto were heavily damaged by
bombings, and many urbanites became homeless and destitute. The  economy was
in ruins, left with 25 to 30 percent of prewar economic production capacity.
Merchant shipping, inland transportation, and textile equipment were virtually
wiped out. The yen was worth barely a fraction of its prewar value. The
repatriation of 6.5 million soldiers and civilians sharply increased the
demand for food, shelter, and essential consumer goods, already in acute
shortage.

Occupation and Reform (1945-52)

     Demilitarization and democratization were the two immediate policy
objectives of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP), General Douglas A. MacArthur. His actions, under the guidance of the
United States government, were-to the relief of the Japanese people-more
moderate and less punitive than was favored by some of the Allied powers,
especially the Soviet Union. These actions were taken through the Japanese
civil authorities. MacArthur was under the nominal supervision of the
eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission in Washington and was advised in the
exercise of his authority by the Allied Council for Japan located in Tokyo,
composed of representatives of the United States, Britain, China, and the
Soviet Union.

     Demilitarization was speedily carried out; demobilization of the former
imperial army, navy, and air forces was completed by early 1946. Political
reforms began in October 1945 when the SCAP issued a directive on civil
liberties-this came to be known as the Japanese "Bill of Rights." This order
severely limited the power of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the centralized
police system, ordered the release of political prisoners, and removed
restrictions on fundamental rights. Political parties revived. Among them were
the Japan Communist Party, which became legal for the first time; the Japan
Socialist Party, formed by survivors of the pre-1940 socialist groups; the
Liberal Party and the Progressive Party (no relation to the parties first
formed in the 1880s), major parties organized by conservatives who had
belonged to the pre-war Rikken Seiyukai and Minseito parties; and a number of
smaller political groups.

     In October 1945 a new cabinet acceptable to the SCAP was formed by
Baron Shidehara Kijuro, who had left public life in the 1930s because of his
opposition to militarism. At MacArthur's urging, the government started
preparing a new constitution; the initial draft represented only a minor
departure from the Meiji Constitution and thus occupation authorities produced
a separate working draft, which, slightly modified, became the constitution
promulgated in November 1946, to take effect on May 3, 1947.

     The 1947 Constitution, still in effect in 1981 without change, represents
a substantial departure from the Meiji Constitution of 1889 in that the
highest organ of government is the popularly elected bicameral National Diet.
The emperor, who on January 1, 1946, renounced his divinity, is retained as
"the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people," but sovereignty is
transferred from him to the Japanese people. Executive power is entrusted to
a cabinet formed by the parliamentary majority party and responsible to the
Diet. The courts are made independent of the other branches of government; the
Supreme Court is given power of constitutional review. Local self-government
is strengthened, and elective assemblies are created at every level of local
administration.

     Civil liberties are strongly emphasized in the new charter as "eternal
and inviolate." Women are given full equality with men, and labor is permitted
to organize. In an important innovation, Article 9 of the Constitution
renounces the right of the nation to make war or to use the threat of force in
international disputes; no armed forces are to be maintained.

     Land reform was the first of the basic economic reform measures
undertaken by occupation authorities. Two bills, passed in October 1946,
required large landowners to sell excess land to the government, which resold
it to tenants at moderate prices. Over 2.7 million farmers obtained 4.46
million acres of land under the program.

     Extensive labor legislation implemented the constitutional right to
organize. The labor movement (and the leftist political parties closely
affiliated with it) grew rapidly. Other economic directives in 1945 and 1946
ordered the dissolution of the zaibatsu combines, and further regulatory laws
were passed by the government in 1947. These anti-zaibatsu acts were designed
to decentralize the economy.

     Reform of the police occurred in 1947. Its purpose was to eliminate the
thought-control and indoctrination aspects of pre-World War II government
practice and policies. The Ministry of Home Affairs was abolished, and the
police were reorganized into national, municipal, local, and rural police; all
but the national police were free of central government control except during
a national emergency.

     The general educational system was also reorganized as a means of
hastening the process of democratization. A stress on equal opportunity and
full development of the individual personality replaced the emphasis of the
Meiji Imperial Rescript on Education. Ultranationalistic indoctrination and
military training were banned and, significantly, were accompanied by the
disestablishment of Shinto as the state religion. The Confucian- and
Shinto-based "morals" or ethics courses were replaced by new ones aimed at
fostering citizenship, democratic spirit, and religious tolerance. The reform
also wrought important structural changes. Public education was decentralized
to the prefectures. Administration was placed in the hands of newly created
local boards of education. Control over the curriculum and content of
textbooks was taken away from the Ministry of Education and vested in local
school authorities. Teachers were freed from rigid codes and permitted to
organize in unions. Sex discrimination was prohibited and coeducation allowed.

     The provision of the Potsdam Declaration calling for punishment of war
criminals was dealt with by the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, composed of representatives of the eleven Allied powers. Established in
Tokyo in 1948, the tribunal tried and sentenced to death or imprisonment
twenty-five Japanese officials (General Tojo among them) for having planned
the war in violation of international law. More than 4,000 others were tried
in Japan and abroad by Allied tribunals on lesser charges. Occupation
authorities also barred from public office 202,000 persons (57 percent of whom
were from the military) for involvement in war preparations and aggression
before 1945. The purge did not prove to be permanent. Pressed by the need for
experienced and able public officials, the Japanese government rescinded the
purge order after the occupation ended.

     Whereas the initial and most important period of the occupation-from 1945
to 1948-was marked by reform, the second phase was one of retrenchment and
stabilization, in which some reforms already undertaken were modified, and
greater attention was given to improvement of the economy. The economic
recovery became a pressing concern because, without it, the success of the
reforms would be undermined and because of the heavy expense to the United
States in maintaining the economy even at a subsistence level. Occupation
policies were accordingly readjusted; this development was essentially in
tune with the view of Japan's conservative strong man, Yoshida Shigeru, a
prominent former diplomat. The ordered breakup of the zaibatsu was slowed
down; the vociferous demands of labor were curtailed to ensure industrial
peace and production, and efforts to check inflation and revive Japanese
exports were greatly intensified.

     The change in emphasis from reform to stability was prompted, of course,
by the intensification of the Cold War shortly after the end of World War II.
Japan's geopolitical position, industrial capacity, and potential military
power increasingly took on a strategic importance that had not been taken into
account when the war ended. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and
perceived role of the Soviet Union in that conflict provided further impetus
for United States interest in the revival of Japan through economic
rejuvenation, rearmament, and the possible inclusion of Japan in a
still-to-be-defined scheme of regional defense arrangements.

     To the sluggish Japanese economy the Korean War proved a blessing in
disguise. Expenditures by United States forces for goods and services in
Japan, which was the main staging area for military action in Korea, gave a
much needed stimulus to Japanese factories. Military purchases by the United
States government for its troops stationed in Japan were also a significant
factor. The amount of these purchases was considerable, enough to pay for a
quarter of Japan's annual commodity imports from 1952 to 1956.

     Within weeks of the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the occupation
headquarters authorized the Japanese government to create a paramilitary force
of 75,000 men for the maintenance of internal security. Officially called the
National Police Reserve, this force was to evolve as the nucleus of Japan's
Self-Defense Forces-SDF (see The Self-Defense Forces, ch. 8).

     As early as 1947 the United States sought to negotiate a treaty of peace
with Japan and to restore full sovereignty to the Japanese. No progress was
made because of Soviet opposition. In 1950 the United States proceeded without
Soviet participation, which appeared unrealistic in light of the Korean War.
The treaty was signed at San Francisco in September 1951 by Japan, the United
States, and forty-seven other nations. The Soviet Union and some other
countries refused to sign it. Ratified by all signatories, the treaty went
into effect in April 1952, officially terminating the United States military
occupation and restoring full independence to Japan.

     Japanese sovereignty was restored over the four main islands of Honshu,
Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and smaller adjacent islands. But the treaty
confirmed its losses of all former overseas possessions including the Kuril
Islands and southern Sakhalin, both of which had been under Soviet occupation
since 1945 (but the status of the Soviet-occupied Kuril Islands was left
unclear because of the Soviet refusal to sign the treaty). Japan agreed to
United States administration of the reparations in amounts to be separately
agreed to with each claimant country. It also stated that Japan had the right
to self-defense and that the country could authorize the stationing of foreign
troops in Japan.

     The issue of mutual security was dealt with in a security treaty between
the United States and Japan that became effective in February 1952. This pact
provided for United States bases and facilities in Japan and the stationing of
forces there. The United States for its part undertook to defend Japan in case
of attack. Japan was not committed, however, to participate in any
arrangements in the United States-sponsored security in the western Pacific in
view of its own constitutional restriction on overseas involvement.

Japan since 1952

     The end of the occupation did not precipitate any crisis of political
transition, nor did it result in administrative discontinuity. Nor was the end
greeted with any massive national rejoicing over the recovery of full
sovereignty. Transition was uneventful. The civil bureaucracy, which had
served as the administrative instrument of the occupation authorities,
remained securely in place under the continued dominance of conservatives, who
had worked closely with the occupation authorities while at the same time
holding a firm grip on the domestic leverages of power. In fact the
conservative character of the ruling elite was further solidified by the
gradual return after 1950 of many depurged prewar politicians to the political
arena. Pragmatic and highly dedicated, the conservatives, led by Yoshida
Shigeru, were confirmed in power through the first post-independence general
elections held in October 1952; about one-third of the dominant group elected
at that time had been active in prewar politics and depurged since 1950. The
ruling elite, comprised mainly of former prewar politicians and bureaucrats,
were generally united in their efforts to bring about a rapid economic
recovery and growth, to maintain a democratic political system, and to
cultivate close ties with the United States as a most practical means of
securing benefits for Japan's economy and security.

     In the years after 1952 some of the occupation reforms survived the test
of viability whereas some had to be revised or abolished. In the mid-1950s the
Japanese government began to review the status of the occupation-imposed
changes, a measure that came to be popularly known as "the reverse course."
The purpose of the measure was to determine the merits of some of the
controversial reforms in light of Japanese realities. Not surprisingly the
reverse course was criticized by a strong coalition of intellectuals, labor
union members, left-wing political circles, and even some moderate elements
within the ruling conservative camp. The opposition was apprehensive about a
possible reversion to prewar authoritarianism and militaristic tendencies; the
fear was fueled in no small measure by the fact that some of the architects of
the reverse course had been leading participants in prewar and wartime
cabinets.

     The reverse course was intimately linked to the Japanese government's
quest for self-identity, political stability, and economic rehabilitation. Its
results were mixed, but the much publicized fear of retrogression into prewar
era was not borne out by actual events. Notable among the occupation reforms
affected by the reverse program was the recentralization of the police
authority-but without restoring the prewar power of arbitrary arrests-under
the unified control of the National Police Agency. For industrial peace and
minimum disruptions in the public service sectors, labor laws were revised to
deny government workers the right to strike-over vehement labor protests. The
organization of industry, already benefiting from relaxation of occupation
controls over the zaibatsu, tended toward reconsolidation. Many of the former
financial-industrial empires such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo were
reestablished so as to improve the Japanese competitive position in the world
markets. These firms, however, did not regain the monopolistic power of their
predecessors, nor were they characterized as they formerly had been by
family-centered management. The practice of educational autonomy based on
locally elected school boards failed to gain much popular appreciation and was
abolished. Public sentiment favoring the reintroduction of ethics courses in
the schools gained some momentum but not enough to overcome the widespread
concern about the return of prewar thought-control measures. Indeed Japanese
response to the occupation reforms was generally pragmatic. Reversions to
prewar facism appeared unlikely then, as in the early 1980s, because social
legislation during the occupation had created strong extraparliamentary
pressure groups in labor unions, among farmers, teachers, and intellectuals.

     A most controversial issue facing Japan in the mid-1950s concerned the
right to national defense and rearmament. Because this right was circumscribed
by Article 9 of the Constitution, at the heart of growing public debate was
whether that article should be revised to legalize the establishment of a
formal defense organization. The debate was, not surprisingly, an intense
partisan concern of the conservative advocates for revision and their
socialist opposition and its allies. A commission was finally formed in 1956
to review the Constitution. Years later it recommended a revision of Article 9
and other provisions in the basic charter both to legalize the creation of
armed forces and to strengthen the authority of the central government.
Nothing came of these recommendations because the ruling conservatives did not
have the support of two-thirds majority in either chamber of the Diet.
Therefore given the difficulty of a constitutional amendment as early as 1954,
the government in that year decided to address the issue of defense through
legislative enactment that required a simple majority of parliamentary
support. In 1954 the Self-Defense Forces having separate land, sea, and air
force components were officially established but actually as successor to the
original National Police Reserve, renamed the National Safety Force in
mid-1952 (see Background, ch. 8).

     Politically several parties emerged in the 1950s and 1960s from periodic
mergers, splits, or remergers. In November 1955 the two major conservative
parties, the Liberal and the Democratic, joined forces to form the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). The merger was in response to the reuniting of the
factionally divided Socialists in the preceding month under the banner of the
Japan Socialist Party. The LDP, of course, had its share of factional
infighting; it was and remains essentially a coalition of several factions
constantly jockeying for advantages. Intraparty tensions were intense, but the
party managed to retain its parliamentary dominance through successive
electoral victories. Intimately linked to big business, the bureaucracy, and a
rural constituency, the LDP derived its strength from a combination of its
generally centrist position in the political spectrum, remarkable economic
achievements under its stewardship, the stability of internal and external
environments, and significantly, the continued fragmentation and ineptness of
opposition parties. The party's political fortunes appeared secure in the
early 1980s, but this optimism was clouded somewhat in view of its declining
share of Diet seats and popular votes. In the general elections of February
1955-held before their merger-the conservatives had 63.5 percent of seats in
the lower House of Representatives on a similar margin of popular votes; the
corresponding indicators after the general elections of December 1976 were
48.7 percent and 41.8 percent, respectively. The 1976 elections were notable
if only because for the first time in twenty-one years the LDP failed to
return a simple majority of 256 seats in the lower house (the party won only
249 seats-see The Liberal Democratic Party, ch. 6).

     The socialist merger in 1955 had only marginal if any effect on the
party's political fortunes. In the general elections of February 1958 the
reunited socialists failed to supplant the LDP, returning only 35.5 percent of
the lower house seats they contested. The 32.9 percent of popular votes they
garnered were drawn mostly from organized labor that the socialists
controlled, urban lower classes, some intellectuals, and youths. Part of the
socialists' difficulty in evoking broad support was the ideological coloration
that characterized their political campaigns. To an essentially pragmatic
Japanese electorate, some of the socialist appeals and slogans appeared
outdated and sterile. Moreover the Japan Socialist Party in the 1955-59 period
was rent by intense factional fegding over such issues as class struggle,
nationalization of basic industries, military alliance, rearmament, and
foreign policy. In 1960 the moderate right-wing of the party split off to form
the Democratic Socialist Party. The left-wing, the larger of the two factions,
continued as the Japan Socialist Party. In the 1960s and 1970s the left-wing
group toned down some of its doctrinaire lines, but its gains were minimal at
the polls. The right-wing and left-wing Socialists together managed to hold
about one-third of the seats in the lower chamber of the Diet (see The
Opposition Parties, ch. 6).

     The founding of the Clean Government Party (Komeito) in 1964 introduced a
new element into Japanese politics. Unlike other secularly based parties, the
Komeito emerged as the aggressive political arm of the Soka Gakkai, the
largest of Japan's postwar new religions, whose avowed mission was to
propagate the Nichiren Buddhist sect first founded in the thirteenth century.
The party's electoral program was pragmatic, addressed to the needs of the
middle and lower strata of the urban population. Its electric appeals
contained rightist, centrist, and even leftist elements and were tailored
especially to accommodate the urban migrants-the young, unskilled, unorganized
factory workers. After the elections of December 1969 the Komeito became the
second largest opposition party after the Japan Socialist Party. Although
centrist for the most part in its political stance, the party's electoral
gains were largely at the expense of the Socialists who traditionally
attracted the bulk of votes from the urban electorate. Another consequence
was, of course, the further fragmentation of the opposition camp.

     To most Japanese, communism was long regarded as alien and subversive and
was associated mainly with the Soviet Union. The Japan Communist Party,
therefore, had a difficult time in gaining acceptance as a Japanese party
catering to the needs of the Japanese people. In 1949 the Communists received
nearly 3 million popular votes and won thirty-five seats in the lower house of
the Diet. These gains, which surprised the Communists themselves, were wiped
out after the Korean War, and it took the Communists many years to regain a
measure of respectability by declaring independence from the Soviet Union and
China and also by portraying a new image of moderation and responsibility. In
the elections of 1972 and 1976 they captured thirty-eight and seventeen,
seats, respectively. In 1972 the Communists placed a distant third after the
LDP's 271 seats and the Japan Socialist Party's 118. Popular votes for the
Communists were 10.5 percent in 1972 and 10.4 percent in 1976. Most of these
votes came from the urban poor in Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto.

     By the time of the Peace Treaty the Japanese economy had grown
considerably from its immediate postwar doldrums in 1946 when industrial
production was one-third of the 1934-36 level. By 1950 the production index
jumped to 84 percent of the prewar level and by 1955 both gross national
product (GNP-see Glossary) and national income had surpassed prewar levels.
The postwar recovery was over by the mid-1950s.

     The growth continued through the boom years of the 1960s and into the
early 1970s when the oil crisis of 1973-74 brought recession to Japan. Between
1954 and 1967 the GNP grew at an annual rate of 10.1 percent in constant
prices, faster than any other national economy during the period. This feat
was accomplished by collaboration between private enterprise and the LDP
government. The latter played a useful role by providing "administrative
guidance" to the private sectors in the form of long-range planning,
persuasion, and control. The government was especially supportive of those
industries that had high growth potential for exports and the expansion of
domestic and foreign markets. Lacking in resources critical to industrial
expansion, Japan was indeed driven by the so-called "export or perish" policy
that it believed was necessary to pay for the import of raw materials. To no
one's surprise the structure of production changed as Japanese industry
concentrated increasingly on export-oriented products of highly advanced
technology. The value of capital-intensive goods steadily expanded as a share
of the gross factory production. Exports boomed impressively under the active
guidance of the government and aggressive salesmanship of private concerns. By
the late 1950s and thereafter the expansion of Japan's foreign trade had
already caused some adverse reaction in the United States and Western Europe
because of allegedly unfair pricing practices and because of restrictions on
imports and entry of foreign capital into Japan. In 1965 Japan had its first
export surplus in the postwar era. By 1968 it had overtaken the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany) to become the second largest industrial
power after the United States in the noncommunist world (third if the Soviet
Union is taken into account). Japan's economic success was not without cost,
however. It came under rising pressure from other nations to reduce its trade
surplus, to contribute more broadly a greater share of assistance toward the
development of other nations, and to accept a measure of responsibility in
world affairs commensurate with its economic presence and influence.

     The remarkable economic success was facilitated by several factors.
Postwar Japan inherited a literate, industrious, and disciplined population.
Its well-developed human resources contained not only an experienced class of
administrators, managers, and technocrats but also an abundant supply of
skilled and semiskilled but cheap labor. Freed from the economic burdens of
rearmament, the LDP regime could extend generous support to the rebuilding of
heavy industry. In this process, initially at least, Japanese industry
benefited greatly from easy access to foreign technology through licensing
arrangements. Technical innovations were undertaken on a most rational basis.
There was little or no resistance from organized labor inasmuch as many of the
industrial plants and machinery had been either destroyed or were obsolescent.
A general expansion of world markets in the postwar years proved a great boon
to the Japanese economy.

     In an effort to lessen dependence on foreign technology but more
importantly because Japan had been largely cut off from worldwide scientific
developments during World War II, the Japanese government in 1956 established
the Science and Technology Agency in the Office of the Prime Minister. The
agency was made responsible for planning program development, basic promotion,
and for coordination of general administrative measures in scientific and
technological areas among the various government ministries. At that time as
in the 1970s, the administration of government-associated science and
technology was carried out by the ministry that had jurisdiction over
semigovernmental corporations such as the National Space Development Agency
and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute.

     One of the most significant events since World War II in the development
of Japanese science was the establishment of a specialized city northeast of
Tokyo. Named after Mount Tsukuba, at whose base it is located, the science
city was founded by the government as a national research center (under the
jurisdiction of the Agency of Science and Technology) that would include not
only government facilities but also private institutes. Most of the government
research agencies housed in the city were relocated from the Tokyo area, but
some were moved there from other parts of the country. Completed in 1978
Tsukuba Science City, as it was called, contained not only research and
educational facilities but also low-cost housing developments and shops as
well as school and such other facilities as were required to satisfy usual
daily family living needs.

     In foreign affairs the Peace Treaty of 1952 did not fully restore Japan's
international relations and standing in the world community. In addition to
the Soviet-bloc nations, other countries such as India and Burma did not sign
the original treaty; similar treaties were concluded with the latter two
countries, however, in 1952 and 1954, respectively. Some countries required
agreement by Japan for payment of reparations for war damages as a condition
for resumption of diplomatic relations. This was the case with Burma, as it
was with the Philippines (1956), Indonesia (1958), and the Republic of Korea
(South Korea-1965).

     In 1952 Japan signed a peace treaty with the Nationalist regime located
since 1949 on the island of Taiwan. The agreement did not prejudice Japan's
freedom to negotiate with China, with which unofficial trade relations were
established in 1953. In 1972 amid growing domestic pressure and progress
toward detente between the United States and China, Japan normalized
diplomatic relations with China and severed its formal ties with Taiwan.

     Japan became a member of the United Nations (UN) in December 1956 after
reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on the termination of hostilities
between them and the resumption of diplomatic relations. Until then the Soviet
Union had blocked Japan's admission (which was sponsored by the United
States); unresolved problems between Japan and the Soviet Union at the time
and since were centered on territorial questions (see Relations with the
Soviet Union, ch. 7).

     Japan gained international stature Mteadily in the postwar decades. Its
contacts were broadened by admission to a number of UN specialized agencies
and regional cooperative organizations. Dominant themes underlying Japan's
foreign relations were all focused on trade; there was little inclination on
Japan's part to become entangled in any foreign conflicts in any role,
believing as it did strongly that its economic progress and national welfare
hinged vitally on a stable, conflict-free, regional and international
environment. For its own security Japan continued to rely on the United
States, which in the 1970s maintained over 45,000 military personnel in the
country.

     Achievements on both domestic and international fronts became translated
into a new mood of renewed national self-confidence. Japan's role as the
host-country for the Olympic Games in 1964 and for a world's fair called Expo
'70, held in Osaka, did much to enhance the nation's prestige, not to mention
Japanese pride in postwar achievements. Both events were significant because
they were the first to be staged in Asia, or for that matter, the first ever
in any country outside the Western industrial nations. The reversion of the
Ryukyu Islands from United States to Japanese control in 1972 was notable also
in that it removed from the Japanese-United States relationship an emotional
issue concerning the residual sovereignty of the islands. (The Bonins had been
restored to Japan in 1958-see Relations with the United States, ch. 7.)

     In the 1970s Japan was by no means home free, however. The oil crisis of
1973-74 exposed the country's vulnerability to an external conflict over which
it had no control. It had a most sobering effect in that Japan was not only
the world's largest oil importer but also its energy-dependent heavy
industries were responsible for three-quarters of Japan's exports. Another
critical problem facing the country in the 1970s was Japan's trade linkage to
the rest of the world. According to Charles Smith of the London-based
Financial Times (July 17, 1978), "The dependence of Japan on the West as a
market for its exports and the unwillingness of the West to go on absorbing
such exports unless it can secure what it considers to be a reasonable share
of the Japanese market for its products probably represents the biggest single
source of trouble in world trade today."

     Domestically Japan had to grapple with, ironically, the adverse side
effects of the very thing it had striven for so hard-economic success.
Environmental pollution, urbanization, housing shortages, and inflation became
daily problems, not lending themselves to easy solution. These problems, of
course, created mounting pressures for the LDP government-often giving rise to
probing questions about the efficacy of conservative LDP leadership (see The
Liberal Democratic Party, ch. 7.).

                                       * * *

     Excellent works on Japan are available in profusion, but there is still
no single definitive volume covering all aspects of Japanese history. Those
who are interested in a more detailed reading on the subject matter may
consult the relevant chapters of Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank,
East Asia: The Great Tradition; John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and
Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation; John Whitney Hall's
Japan from Prehistory to Modern Times; and George B. Sansom's Japan: A Short
Cultural History. The following books also provide a reliable introduction to
Japanese history: Conrad Totman's Japan Before Perry: A Short History, Toshio
G. Tsukahira's Feudal Control in Tokugawa Japan: The Sankin-Kotai System, W.G.
Beaseley's The Modern History of Japan, Hugh Borton's Japan's Modern Century,
Richard Storry's A History of Modern Japan, Peter Duus' The Rise of Modern
Japan, and Kawai Kazuo's Japan's American Interlude. On the subject of the
history of ideas from the early centuries of Japan, Sources of Japanese
Tradition, compiled by Tsunoda Ryusaku, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene
is recommended. (For further information see Bibliography.)