Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0045/00459.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob00459}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Romania
Romania in the Summer of 1939}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, D Hist}
$Affiliation{Embassy of Romania, Washington DC}
$Subject{romania
pact
august
romanian
moscow
romania's
soviet
bucharest
war
political}
$Date{1990}
$Log{}
Title:       Romania
Book:        Romanian Military History
Author:      Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, D Hist
Affiliation: Embassy of Romania, Washington DC
Date:        1990

Romania in the Summer of 1939

     In the period prior to the second world flare-up, Romania remained, at
all costs, consistent with the alliances orchestrated by the French-British
diplomacy and initiated multiple actions to forestall, on a general, and
particularly on a local plane, an all-out aggression. Like always before,
Romania's diplomatic contacts pursued the defence of the state's territorial
integrity, the improvement of relations with the neighbouring states in the
belief that the establishment of normal relations could prevent territorial
revisions in the area, and remove the specter of war. Yet the Big Powers, by
their diplomatic games in the summer of 1939 did not meet the legitimate hopes
of Bucharest. Romania was in no way involved in the evolution of events in the
summer of 1939, events rolling to an outbreak of hostilities.

     To attain such objectives, Bucharest diplomacy had put out feelers,
especially in the capitals of the big allied powers, Paris and London, with a
view to keeping southeast Europe out of the oncoming conflict. Along this
line, besides attempts to sound the real intentions of the big powers, Romania
had shown its preoccupation for a British-French-Soviet understanding to bar
the ascent of the Third Reich within southeast Europe as well as to normalize
its relations with some neighbouring revisionist states at a time when the
major goal was to safeguard the peace.

     A basic rationale of Romania was to consolidate its alliance with the
states in the Balkan Entente. Proof thereof stands the August 1939 visit by
the Romanian head of state to Turkey. The Bucharest authorities were relying
on Turkey even in the eventuality of a non-aggression pact concluded with the
Soviet Union, provided the latter acknowledged Romania's territorial
integrity. Confronted with Ismet Inonu and N. Menemencioglu, Carol II
expressed Romania's resolve to resist "in case of attacks" and confessed that
his country had until then pursued a "policy of precautions" in order to shun
"German antagonism". Moreover, the Romanian head of state proved skeptical
with regard to collaboration with the Soviet Union which Romania could not
trust as long as it did not assure "de jure acknowledgment of Bessarabia's
frontier. Carol II grounded his opinions on the impasse of the tripartite
negotiations, and on certain information relayed by the Romanian and foreign
diplomatic offices in connection with Soviet-German negotiations on the
conclusion of a political and economic treaty. An agreement was reached that
the two parties take common stands in London and Paris in order to determine
the "western democracies" to "immediately" assume the obligations provided in
the guarantee declarations.

     After his return to Bucharest, the king gave an audience to Adrien
Thierry, on August 19. The French diplomat found Carol II "very firm in his
resolve to put up resistance". Yet, he transmitted to Quai d'Orsay that "his
firmness depends, above all, on the country's potential for resistance in the
face of the aggressor." Moreover, the French ambassador noted that "the
Romanians are decided to defend themselves in case of armed aggression and
maintain that they are ready to resist an economic ultimatum from Germany." In
the face of the worsening international situation following the headway of the
Third Reich, Carol II expressed Romania's wish to remain neutral "as long as
possible provided she is not subject to a direct attack."

     The Romanian means of information showed special interest in the
development of the tripartite talks. Public opinion, in consensus with
Bucharest diplomacy considered the tripartite alliance a vital necessity,
meeting the desire of all independent states in Europe to be sheltered from
war. On August 8, 1939 Armand Calinescu noted that these talks "can lead to
positive results." Romania pinning great hopes in the power of understanding
of the three Big Powers. The conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty between
the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France would have essentially changed the
balance of forces in the world to the detriment of the fascist states, new
aggressions being thus prevented.

     The discussions between military missions, as well as the political
negotiations, threw into relief the disagreement between the British
viewpoint, supported by the French, and the Soviet one. Two days after the
beginning of the talks, W. Seeds contacted the Foreign Office to inform on his
first observations. From the very start, he reported, Marshal K. Voroshilov
tried to learn whether the Soviet troops could act against the German troops
on Polish and Romanian territories. Remarking that Poland and Romania "are
independent states" Admiral Drax suggested to the Soviet representative to
apply for a direct answer from these governments, this being "the simplest and
most direct solution." "Competent observers" Seeds relayed, "are impressed
with Voroshilov's apparent sincerity, he seeming most willing to have the
military operations carried on outside the Soviet territory." The head of the
Foreign Office confessed in a cable to John Le Rougetel, on August 17, that,
as far as the Romanian government was concerned, there was no intention "to
contact it on this matter for the time being."

     On August 17, since Great Britain and France had not yet answered
Voroshilov's questions, the tripartite talks were adjourned for a few days, in
order to give the London and Paris governments the possibility to send the
clarifications required by the Soviets.

     The Soviet Union was leading in parallel two rounds of negotiations; an
official one, through K. Voroshilov, with the British-French and secret
negotiations with Germany through V.M. Molotov. Because the Soviet's
bargainings with the British-French were going on very slowly Stalin decided,
on August 19, to strike the agreement with the Nazi Reich. He accepted, for
August 23, a Moscow visit by the German foreign minister, Joachim von
Ribbentrop.

     The Foreign Office had acted without haste during the tripartite
negotiations out of a desire to succeed. The hesitations, vague proposals and
complicated wording had created doubts as to Great Britain's decision to make
a military intervention. On September 3, the doubt was to prove unfounded.
Anyway France had offered much more, sensing the catastrophic effects the
failure of the tripartite negotiations could trigger off. Nevertheless, the
action of the two "western democracies" bore the onus of the Munich Pact.
During the negotiations, Moscow had not mentioned the pact signed in the
Bavarian capital. Yet mistrust in connection with this past move had hovered
over the talks. To offset this the negotiators would have had to pull out of
their sleeves a further trump: Poland's formal adhesion. And this adhesion was
unfortunately missing. The head of the Sanocja showed no discomfort when
learning about von Ribbentrop's trip to Moscow which he saw as one "more
reason" justifying his lack of confidence in the Soviet Union. Great Britain
and France had to take into account, during the Moscow negotiations, several
factors: their delayed military preparations, the diverging views of public
opinion, the refusal of the Baltic states and of Poland to let the Soviet Army
enter their territories. The reasons behind the protracted talks and their
final failure must be sought in the deep-going contradictions between the
governments interested, and in the ambiguities implied. As far as Romania is
concerned, she did not participate in the final act of the drama. The western
powers did not inform her of the final negotiations in Moscow. Romania's
diplomacy was not asked anything and Bucharest did not have to make any
decision, one reason for which it carried no responsibility for the failure of
the tripartite negotiations.

     The German-Soviet pact signed on August 23, 1939 featured two main parts.
First, a non-aggression treaty which was made public on August 24. The
accompanying secret protocol had three main items. The first acknowledged to
the area of Soviet influence: Finland, Estonia and Letonia, "in the case of a
political-territorial change". Lithuania was in the area of the Reich's
influence. The two big powers acknowledged Lithuania's interests in Vilna. The
following item established the limits of the influence zones in Poland, on the
Narev-Vistula-San line" and added: "the matter whether the interests of both
sides make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state, as well
as the delimitation of this State's frontiers will be finaly decided only
during the subsequent political events. Anyway, the two governments will solve
this question by a friendly understanding." Item three read as such: "As far
as southeastern Europe is concerned, the Soviet side stresses on its interests
in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in
these territories."

     In Europe, no one was deceived as to the meaning of the Moscow treaty.
Romania's international situation worsened, her isolation on an exterior plane
coming to a decisive point. Premier Armand Calinescu, sensing the perils
looming at the horizon highlighted that "the situation is very serious." At
the same time, the situation was similarly appraised by the opposing side. On
August 25, Adolf Hitler told Mussolini he was convinced "Romania is no longer
in a position to take part in the conflict against the Axis."

     The Bucharest officials showed concern at the conclusion of the Moscow
Pact. Grigore Gafencu, in a talk with the German diplomat Steltzer, after
having remarked that Bucharest had received the tidings "most peacefully",
stressed that Romania "will value the new pact to the extent it is apt - and
we hope it is - to strengthen general peace." Carol II, in a meeting with
the American minister in Bucharest, though not surprized at the conclusion of
the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, expressed "his pessimism" as to its consequences
for international life. The king believed that by the relevant move, Hitler
had managed "to eliminate a potential enemy" and that the western heads of
state "must have been very naive to actually think they could determine Russia
to fight for them." In his Diary the king wrote: "For us it is most
dangerous since one of the hopes we have fostered to have a flank or our back
safe has vanished." After a meeting with Armand Calinescu and Grigore
Gafencu, the head of the Romanian state noted that his country's interest was
that "the British and the French turn up successful" and Romania "manage to
shun the war as much as possible." Yet Carol II continued "we are in the
most terrible situation, with enemies on three frontiers coveting parts of our
territory".

     From a note sent to London by ambassador Eric Phipps we understand that
Gheorghe Tatarascu had told Bonnet "somewhat uneasy" that Romania was
"worried" by the Moscow pact. The Romanian ambassador in Paris declared to the
French authorities in Paris that "Romania feels her enemies are much too
close and her friends much too far away." The same Phipps, in a cable sent on
August 26 noted that the head of the European Department at Quai d'Orsay had
told him that despite king Carol II's firm declarations, "Romania was the
most threatened" (italics ours) of all the countries affected by the pact.

     The signing of the Soviet-German pact was greatly unsatisfactory for the
Reich's allies, Japan and Italy. The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact prompted the
British and the French governments to reconsider their positions in the
international life. On August 24, Al. Cadogan noted in his Diary that the
government and the heads of the general staff had mentioned in their
interventions "the risks posed by the German-Soviet understanding". The French
Premier, Daladier, stated in the Committee of National Defence that the
pact "changes the balances of forces, encourages Hitler and poses a great
threat to France."

     From Bucharest A. Thierry informed Paris on the manner the news of the
Soviet-German pact had been received. "Its consequences" wrote the French
diplomat "are considerable both psychologically and politically. The Romanians
feel threatened by the German-Russian understanding which can very well call
again into question the Dniester frontier." On the other hand, remarked
Thierry, the agreement between Berlin and Moscow "provides Germany with a
fresh possibility to put pressure on Romania."

     The United States of America were not too happy with the Moscow pact.
F.D. Roosevelt conferred a lot with his main advisers, C. Hull and Summer
Wells, on the worsening international situation. The American diplomats
accredited to Europe informed permanently the State Department on the
prospects of southeast and eastern Europe in the conditions of the Moscow
pact. For J.E. Davies it was "a catastrophic calamity" and "probably one of
Great Britain's biggest diplomatic defeats ever" - "The Balkans have suffered
the disastrous effect of the Russian-German pact. Romania is actually caught
in a pincer", wrote Davies to the secretary of the American head executive.

     The Soviet-German treaty did not affect Romania's good neighbourly policy
to the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Gr. Gafencu further showed interest in
the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with Moscow. Unfortunately, the
information received from the French ambassador in Moscow could not appease
the leading circles of Bucharest. Secret instructions relayed by the
Comintern to all the communist parties in eastern Europe attacked France and
Great Britain for having wanted to destroy the Rome-Berlin Axis by making big
use of Romania's forces. Ungroundedly, one of the causes for the collapse of
the tripartite talks and the hurried conclusion of the Moscow pact was said to
be "the unfavourable attitude by Poland, Romania and the Baltic States versus
Russia"?!

     The Soviet-German pact struck a bad echo with the social classes in
Romania. A document of the time said that "everybody thinks that the August 23
document will prod Germany to wage war." Its substance was "an understanding
to liquidate Poland and Romania." Germany was ready, said the same document,
to avail itself to Hungary and Bulgaria and support their territorial claims
on Romania".

     The international events of August and particularly the Soviet-German
pact fuelled "warlike spirits" and fed the irredentist feelings of the
minorities in Romania.

     The Soviet-German pact shook seriously Romania's position, abandoning it
in the hands of the two big neighbouring powers. Item three of the additional
secret protocol between Germany and the Soviet Union was in favour of the
revision of the Paris status quo. As far as Romania was concerned the Moscow
Pact anticipated the actions carried out to this end.

     In conclusion, the failure of the Moscow tripartite talks and the signing
of the Soviet-German pact completely changed Romania's political, military and
strategical position and considerably narrowed her chances to act in keeping
with its options. Actually, the entire juridical basis of the Romanian-Soviet
relations was removed and Romania had to further look for new solutions to
defend her independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

AUGUST 23, 1944 - Reconsiderations

FLORIN CONSTANTINIU, D Hist

     The Romanian Revolution in December 1989 created a new framework for the
development of the Romanian society and it is quite natural-historical
experience has proved it - that once with new mutations occured everything or
almost everything to be revised. But it would be a mistake - in our
belief - to engage such an action for the sake of revision only; it would
mean to continue the zigzag lines of some interpretations which have made, in
the last four decades, so many historical events and personalities of the
Romanian people by successively anathematized or eulogised. If we wish to
write history "as it was" we must then retain some ascertainments and
conclusions of the Romanian historiography of near past because they ground
on a large documentation and could resist a critical examination.

     The act of August 23, 1944 belongs to this category of conclusions.
Telling is that a book like Operation Autonomous (London 1989) written by the
former British secret agent Ivor Porter - a good connoisseur of Romania's
political and military realities that he could know on the spot - points out
the grave consequences for the Reich entailed by Romania's volte face and her
role in shortening the war as he placed it in point of signification before
the Allied landing in France (June 6, 1944).

     Romania's remarkable contribution to the defeat of Nazi
Germany - underlined even in the final stage of the World War II by a series
of political and military personalities, press and radio commentators
also - a contribution stressed out in the last years by many history books
too - must be placed in a good light through profound researches concerning
the strategic and logistical consequences of the Act of August 23, 1944. From
this viewpoint it is necessary to further the investigation in the German
sources which have not yet been systematically studied and published. At
present, West Germany is intending to publish the operation diary of the High
Command of the War Marine (OKM). According to British researcher David Irving
it contains numerous and detailed information about the military developments
unfolded in the Romanian habitat in the days of the Romanian army's struggle
against the Wehrmacht. Another direction of investigation is offered by the
British sources. In the last years they were researched and partially employed
in the books of Romanian historians, but the documentary stock is far from
being worked out; we must also add that the genesis of the percentage
agreement between Churchill and Stalin during 9-17 October 1944 concerning
Romania was not the subject to a rigorous reconstitution because, on the one
hand, the archivistic information has not been sufficient enough and, on the
other hand, we have had some restraints in the correct presentation of Stalin
carried on-foreign policy during the war. The above mentioned book authored
by Ivor Porter is bringing new elements of highest interest for knowing the
international framework within which the act of August 23, 1944 was prepared
and carried out. In anticipation of thorough studies on the origins and the
evolution of the Churchill written on paper-formula in October 9, 1944 we
must underline the value of information offered by Ivor Porter (they are
related to the ones known for a longer time from Elisabeth Barker in her
well known book dedicated to the policy promoted by Great Britain in
South-East Europe in the years of war and from the collection of documents
edited by Graham Ross over 1941-1945; the violent reaction of V.M. Molotov
towards the activity of the "Autonomous" group (the hard message addressed to
Churchill on April 29, 1944), the double dealing accusations brought by the
Soviets against the British for the radio cables sent by G. de Castelain from
the building of gendarmerie where he was kept, joined Churchill's stringent
need for gaining the Soviet support in denying the communists' taking power in
Greece, a country considered by London quite vital for securing the Suez Canal
in case of a post-war confrontation between the Great Britain and the Soviet
Union. The idea of an exchange between Romania for the USSR and Greece for
Great Britain made its way in the political circles round Churchill and Eden
just when the leaders of the historical parties in Bucharest engaged to
overthrow Marshal lon Antonescu were still hoping in the western Allies'
support and presence at the moment of Romania's uncoupling from the Reich.

     The "Turkish component" of the international context must be also
pursued taking into consideration the close relation between Bukarest and
Ankara during the war. One should mention in this sense the resume of a
letter of special interest signed by Al. Cretzianu, Romania's Minister to
Ankara, a letter found in the unpublished diary of the Romanian diplomat
Raoul Bossy: "Gafencu is reading me a long letter of 20 pages dated October
20 sent by Al. Cretzianu /.../ He remembers of his appointment to Ankara at
the call of Maniu. He prepared there Stirbey's travel who was sent by both
the government and Maniu in order to feel out the situation in point of the
armistice terms (until then as Dulles let me know we were asked unconditional
capitulation only). Antonescu finally convinced that the Germans would be
defeated and in a raging temper for Hitler's manner to lead the war (who
dissipated madly his troops through the length and breadth of Europe) offered
Maniu the power to conclude the armistice. But the latter would have preferred
Antonescu to conclude the truce and shoulder the responsibility and drawbacks.
Vis-a-vis Antonescu's insistences he wanted that Stirbey feel out the
possible situation in order to appreciate the real risks, without too big
moral and political dangers, involved by the political change of the State.
Once the conditions known, Ica Antonescu submitted Menemencioglu the
proposal, through the agency of Cretzianu, for giving him a capitulation
request to be sent to the Allies under one of the following assumptions:
1. Turkey's entrance the war or, 2. British units landing or parachuting in
the Balkans. But Menemencioglu had just fought, at Cairo, to persuade
Churchill and Eden that it was better for Turkey not enter the war.
Consequently he had no interest to speed up our siding with the Allies, but,
on the contrary, to impede it. The Turkish political action sabotaged and
paralysed our attempts to leave the Axis. At the end, the king (about whom
Cretzianu does not say that he had had direct contacts with Moscow, through
the Romanian communists), and Maniu decided on the coup d'etat but informed
the Allies that it would be mounted concomitantly with a large-scale Russian
offensive. The Allies did not answer to this message, as Cretzianu supposed
because Moscow was not too eager for our siding with the United Nations be
taken by the king and Maniu because it would increase their prestige and
authority inside the country. But as the Russian offensive was unleashed and
the Jassy collapsed, both the king and Maniu overthrew Antonescu without
thinking too hard".

     The same diary supplies important information about another problem
to be also thoroughly and carefully studied: the stand taken by the country's
political parties and forces towards Antonescu's regime and Romania's
volte-face against the Third Reich. The diary of R. Bossy records a
discussion between Bossy and Argetoianu in which the latter said that
Patrascanu, qualified as a "quiet and moderate man" had got into direct touch
with king Michael on the basis of Moscow sent-instructions which "recommended
him not to try the setting up of a mono-communist government as the party
was not strong enough but to collaborate with the democratic parties for
establishing, together with the latter, a left-wing regime". The king asked
that, before opening the dialogue with the communists to receive the Soviet
answer to four questions: the monarchy in Romania; the person of king Michael,
the regaining of Transylvania, the country's economic reconstruction. After
six weeks the answer came: the Soviets were categorical vis-a-vis the
maintenance of monarchy and of king Michael as well as the regaining of
northern Transylvania by Romania but the last point was vaguely made clear:
the problem was to be discussed at the Peace Conference within the efforts
for the reconstruction of South-East Europe.

     Within the same context of the stand taken vis-a-vis Romania's
uncoupling from Germany another subject must be broached, considered a taboo
in our historiography: the Romanians, who having heard of preparations made
for lon Antonescu's overthrown and Romania's disengagement from the Reich,
informed the Germans about this. German documents testify that Professor N.I.
Herescu, who had close ties with the royal quarters, having learned of what
the Hitlerite officials would qualify as a "putsch" would inform Professor
Ernst Gamillscheg, the director of the German Institute in Bucharest who
immediately conveyed the news to the German Legacy. The inquiry ordered by
Hitler to be made after August 23, 1944 about the information received on the
imminent overthrow in Romania brought out to light other similar cases.

     I have referred to only some aspects of the act of August 23, 1944 which
should rivet the attention of our historians. It is a crucial moment in the
Romanian history, an act of prowess of the Romanian army, but defrauded of
the victory fruit within an unfavourable international framework.