I arrived in New York, and made a report to the White Star Line, and asked Mr. Franklin if he had any objections to my writing my own personal story to the New York Times to which he said "No." I had the story already written out, and I had already submitted it to Capt. Sealby, and also to Mr. Franklin, and the story was then handed over to the New York Times. This story, by the way, was handed over a day and a half after the passengers on the Republic had been landed in New York City.
SENATOR SMITH: Is there anything else connected with that matter which will be useful to the committee?
MR. BINNS: I handed in the story to the New York Times Tuesday evening, the 26th of January, and then immediately left for Mr. Bottomley's house, where I was staying at that time.
There was some dispute with the New York Times the following morning regarding the price to be paid for this story, which, I understood, was $500. They offered me a check for $100, which I refused. I then mentioned the matter to Mr. Bottomley, the vice president of the Marconi Co., who took the matter up with the editor of the New York Times, and a check for $250 was eventually sent me, with an explanation saying that had the story been handed in on Monday evening instead of Tuesday it would have been worth the amount they originally offered.
SENATOR SMITH: From your experience as a wireless operator, can you account for the failure to give to the public promptly this information pertaining to the disaster to the Titanic?
MR. BINNS: The only explanation that I could give is the general inadequacy of the set installed on board the Carpathia to cover the distances required in communication with the land stations in that vicinity. The set on the Carpathia is what is known as a coil set, and the combination used is what is known as plain aerial. In this combination the antenna between the masts is joined directly to one side of the spark gap and grounded to the other. In the event of damp or rainy weather the insulators holding the antenna between the masts, becoming moist, allow a great leakage, and this leakage dissipates the energy produced by the coil, and consequently reduces the radius of communication.
At the time of the Titanic disaster the atmosphere in the vicinity was rather moist, and the probability is that the Carpathia was unable to attain more than 75 miles communicating radius.
SENATOR SMITH: The testimony shows that the apparatus on the Carpathia was adapted to communicate 200 miles under favorable conditions, and possibly a longer distance at night under favorable circumstances.
MR. BINNS: Under abnormal conditions. The Carpathia was equipped with the same type of apparatus that was on the Republic at the time of the disaster to that ship.
SENATOR SMITH: What have you to say to the reference to the discipline of operators aboard ship?
MR. BINNS: Nominally, the operator is under the command of the captain, whose orders he must at all times obey. There are no fixed regulations in this respect, and the operator, being in charge of an apparatus that no one else on board understands, is to a great extent thoroughly in charge of the working of it. Where a single operator is employed on the ship, he uses his own discretion as to the times when he is on duty. For that purpose he is supplied with a communication chart by the Marconi Co., which he has to study and take the times for his watch in connection with this chart. The general practice on the Atlantic Ocean is to remain on watch throughout the greater part of the day and take a rest at night.
SENATOR SMITH: Mr. Binns, do you not think it would be more serviceable if, on ships where it is impracticable to have two operators, the watch of the single operator should be from 6 o'clock at night until 6 o'clock in the morning in order that he might always be ready to take communications from other ships at a time when other means of observation are most difficult?
MR. BINNS: In cases where it is impossible or impracticable to have two operators, I think that the operator himself should be on duty during the night watch, and that a cadet, or wireless telegraph learner should be supplied to take the day watch. A man of this description could be very easily obtained, and need have only a slight knowledge of the Morse code, and also a slight knowledge of the wireless apparatus. In the event of a particular ship being called and his not being able to manage the communication, he should immediately call his chief wireless operator. However, I think, and I always have thought that in all cases two operators should be supplied to every vessel.
SENATOR SMITH: Let me call your attention to the fact that the Californian was but 14 miles from the Titanic when it sank. If there had been a wireless operator on duty on the Californian, in all probability every passenger and member of the crew of the Titanic could have been saved.
MR. BINNS: Yes; that is so.
SENATOR SMITH: Do you know the wireless equipment of the Californian at this time?
MR. BINNS: Yes. One of my last assignments in the employ of the Marconi Co. was the overhauling of that apparatus. Some minor trouble had occurred at the end of the first voyage in New York, and I was asked by the United States wireless­telegraph inspector, in my capacity as travelling inspector of the Marconi Co., to overhaul this apparatus and place it in working condition. The set on the Californian is a standard one and one­half kilowatt Marconi apparatus. It is in every way a modern set, and is a very efficient set, and could work to 250 miles under any circumstances.
SENATOR SMITH: How far could it communicate under favorable circumstances?
MR. BINNS: Possibly as a maximum, 500 to 800 miles.
SENATOR SMITH: Why did not the Carpathia's operator give to the Californian all the information in his possession regarding the Titanic disaster, and in that way reach the Olympic and some shore station that would have been serviceable in giving to the public this information?
MR. BINNS: I do not knowwhy. I can not conceive why he did not. I think it might possibly have been done that way. The Californian should have been able to communicate with Cape Race direct from the scene of the accident, which the Carpathia could not do.
SENATOR SMITH: Can you say anything else that will throw any light on the inquiry we are making as to the causes leading up this accident and the subsequent events?
MR. BINNS: I will say this, Senator: Immediately a vessel gets into communication with another vessel, and has seen or passed icebergs of any description, a message to that effect is sent to all others and in this way information of dangers to navigation is always transmitted at the earliest possible moment, as a warning.
SENATOR SMITH: In your practice, this is regarded as the most important information that can be communicated from one ship to another?
MR. BINNS: Yes, sir.
SENATOR SMITH: Have you observed any part of the construction of the Olympic, on which you served, which was followed in the construction of her sister ship, the Titanic, which you think would be of interest to the committee?
MR. BINNS: The Olympic has what is known as two expansion joints. These joints are composed in this way: The ship is split completely through the deck and also through the sides of the ship to a point above the water line; the split is then joined over by a curved piece of steel, which is riveted to each side of the severed part of the ship. The idea of this joint is reduce the excessive vibrations caused by the high speed of the ship. In my opinion, this is an element of weakness and tends to detract from its structural strength. This I observed on the Olympic; and the Titanic was built in the same way. The same feature was followed in the Titanic, which vessel I observed prior to her launching, and the launching of which I also witnessed in Belfast.
I have observed steamship construction, and am quite familiar with the plans of the Olympic and the Titanic, and with those of the Mauritania and the Lusitania of the Cunard Line.
From the plans of the Olympic and the Titanic the vessel has been built to meet every possible accident with the exception of a glancing blow such as the Titanic received. The ship has a certain number of water­tight compartments and also a double bottom; but according to the plans the sides of the ship are just a single shell under the water line, and in the event of a glancing blow extending from one end of the ship to the other the water­tight compartments would be rendered absolutely useless, owing to the fact that there is no side protection.
In the plans of the Mauritania and Lusitania, of the Cunard Line, these vessels are shown to have double cellular sides as well as a double cellular bottom. Also, on the inside of the inner plating of the cellular sides are the coal bunkers, which can also be turned into water­tight compartments. In the event of a glancing blow ripping up the side of one of these vessels, they would still remain afloat, owing to the presence of the inner shell of the vessel's cellular sides. In the event of both the outer and inner plates of the vessel's double cellular side being pierced, an extra protection is afforded by the coal bunkers, which could be temporarily turned into water­tight compartments. This is a very strong point in ship construction, and no vessel should in the future be allowed to be built without this double protection, which, in my opinion makes a ship really unsinkable.
As nearly as I can remember, this double cellular side construction which I have described was a condition precedent to the granting of a subsidy by the British Government to these ships.
SENATOR SMITH: That is all, Mr. Binns. We are very much obliged to you.
TESTIMONY OF OLAUS ABELSETH.
[Testimony taken separately before Senator William Alden Smith, chairman of the subcommittee.]
The witness was sworn by Senator Smith.
SENATOR SMITH: How old are you?
MR. ABELSETH: Twenty­six years of age in June.
SENATOR SMITH: Did you sail on the Titanic?
MR. ABELSETH: Yes.
SENATOR SMITH: From what port?
MR. ABELSETH: From Southampton.
SENATOR SMITH: Where had you been?
MR. ABELSETH: I had been in Norway. I left here last fall.
SENATOR SMITH: Where do you live now?
MR. ABELSETH: My home is in South Dakota, where I have my homestead.
SENATOR SMITH: I wish you would tell the reporter when you first knew of this collision, and what you did, and where you were in the ship. I believe you were a steerage passenger?
MR. ABELSETH: Yes, sir.
SENATOR SMITH: In the forward part of the ship?
MR. ABELSETH: Yes. I was in compartment G on the ship.
SENATOR SMITH: Go ahead and tell us just what happened.
MR. ABELSETH: I went to bed about 10 o'clock Sunday night, and I think it was about 15 minutes to 12 when I woke up; and there was another man in the same room ­ two of us in the same room ­ and he said to me, "What is that?" I said, "I don't know, but we had better get up." So we did get up and put our clothes on, and we two went up on deck in the forward part of the ship.
Then there was quite a lot of ice on the starboard part of the ship. They wanted us to go down again, and I saw one of the officers, and I said to him: "Is there any danger?" He said, "No." I was not satisfied with that, however, so I went down and told my brother­in­law and my cousin, who were in the same compartment there. They were not in the same room, but they were just a little ways from where I was. I told them about what was happening, and I said they had better get up. Both of them got up and dressed, and we took our overcoats and put them on. We did not take any life belts with us. There was no water on the deck at that time.
We walked to the hind part of the ship and got two Norwegian girls up. One was in my charge and one was in charge o f the man who was in the same room with me. He was from the same town that I came from. The other one was just 16 years old, and her father told me to take care of her until we got to Minneapolis. The two girls were in a room in the hind part of the ship, in the steerage.
We all went up on deck and stayed there. We walked over to the port side of the ship, and there were five of us standing, looking, and we thought we saw a light.
SENATOR SMITH: On what deck were you standing?
MR. ABELSETH: Not on the top deck, but on ­ I do not know what you call it, but it is the hind part, where the sitting room is; and then there is a kind of a little space in between, where they go up on deck. It was up on the boat deck, the place for the steerage passengers on the deck. We were then on the port side there, and we looked out at this light. I said to my brother­in­law, "I can see it plain, now. It must be a light."
SENATOR SMITH: How far away was it?
MR. ABELSETH: I could not say, but it did not seem to be so very far. I thought I could see this mast light, the front mast light. That is what I thought I could see.
A little while later there was one of the officers who came and said to be quiet, that there was a ship coming. That is all he said. He did not say what time, or anything. That is all he said.
So, I said to them, we had better go and get the life belts, as we had not brought them with us. So my cousin and I went down to get the life belts for all of us. When we came up again we carried the life belts on our arms for a while.
There were a lot of steerage people there that were getting on one of these cranes that they had on deck, that they used to lift things with. They can lift about two and a half tons, I believe. These steerage passengers were crawling along on this, over the railing, and way up to the boat deck. A lot of them were doing that.
SENATOR SMITH: They could not get up there in any other way?
MR. ABELSETH: This gate was shut.
SENATOR SMITH: Was it locked?
MR. ABELSETH: I do not know whether it was locked, but it was shut so that they could not go that way.
A while later these girls were standing there, and one of the officers came and hollered for all of the ladies to come up on the boat deck. The gate was opened and these two girls went up.
