CAPT. KNAPP: The outer arch around each ship is drawn with a radius of 16 miles., which is approximately the farthest distance at which the curvature of the earth would have permitted the side lights of the Titanic to be seen by a person at the height of the side lights of the Californian, or at which the side lights of the Californian could have been seen by a person at the height of the side lights of the Titanic. The inner circle around each ship is drawn with a radius of 7 miles. This is approximately the distance after reaching which the curvature of the earth would have shut out the side lights of the Californian from the view of one in a lifeboat in the water. It appears, therefore, that if the Titanic's position at the time of the accident was as fixed by the testimony and if it was the side light of the Californian that was seen from the boat deck of the Titanic, the Californian was somewhere inside of the arc of the 16 mile circle drawn about the Titanic. It further appears that if the above hypothesis is correct and if the side lights of the other steamer could not be seen, as is testified to, from one of the lifeboats of the Titanic after being lowered, the Californian was somewhere outside of the circle with the 7­mile radius drawn about the Titanic.
In the case of the Californian, if the steamer which in the testimony given by members of the crew of the Californian, including the captain and the donkey engineman and others, is said to have been seen by them, was the Titanic, she must have been somewhere inside of the circle with the 16­mile radius drawn around the Californian. If that be the case, as the Californian's side light was shut out by the curvature of the earth from the view of anyone in a lifeboat of the Titanic after being lowered into the water, then the Titanic must have been outside of the circle drawn with the 7­mile radius around the Californian.
Further reference to this chart will show plotted a hypothetical position of the Californian. On the hypothesis that the Californian was in this position, a dotted line is drawn on the chart on the bearing given by the captain of the Californian as that on which the steamer was sighted. This bearing is drawn on the chart to intersect the track of the Titanic. Another dotted line is drawn parallel thereto from a point on the course of the Titanic where she apparently was at 10:06 p.m., New York time, April 14 ­ at 11:56 p.m. of that date of the Californian's time ­ at which Ernest Gill, a member of the crew of the Californian, in his testimony before your committee, stated that the large steamer was seen by him. If the Californian was in the hypothetical position shown on the chart, the Titanic could have been seen by the officers and crew of the Californian at the time mentioned.
SENATOR SMITH: Captain, are you able to state to the committee whether there was any vessel between the position of the Titanic just preceding and following the accident and the position of the Californian at that time?
CAPT. KNAPP: From being present at hearings before your committee and from reading the printed testimony of witnesses examined by the committee I am led to the conclusion that if there was any vessel between the Californian and the Titanic at the time referred to she does not seem to have been seen by any of the ships near there on the following morning, nor have there been any reports submitted to the Hydrographic Office which would indicate that there was any such steamer in that locality. The evidence does not indicate to me that there was any such third steamer in those waters, especially in view of the fact that no such steamer was seen by other steamers or by those in the lifeboats the following morning, and as the ice barrier, from all reports, between the reported position of the Californian and that of Titanic was impassable to a vessel proceeding to the westward, and there is no testimony to show that if such a steamer was between the Californian and the Titanic she proceeded to the eastward, the captain of the Californian, having testified that he last saw the said steamer proceeding to the westward and being on a bearing to the westward of the Californian. Nothing appears in the testimony to show that the steamer so seen reversed its course and proceeded to the eastward.
SENATOR SMITH: Captain, it appears from the testimony that there are established, by mutual agreement between the steamship lines, certain fixed courses, tracks or lanes across the north Atlantic, and that the steamship companies order their captain to follow these tracks. Has the captain of a ship any discretion in this matter which would enable him to depart from the given track or course to avoid danger?
CAPT. KNAPP: It is, of course, understood by all seafaring people, and, in fact, it should be understood by the public generally, that the trans­Atlantic steamers, in following certain tracks in crossing the ocean are not supposed to adhere rigidly to those tracks when good seamanship dictates that they diverge therefrom. A seaman is supposed always to handle and navigate a ship in a seamanlike manner, and no hard and fast, rigid rules are laid down that require him to do otherwise. The following is from the International Rules, enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
Art. 29. Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner or master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper lookout or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case. This rule affirms a sea maxim that a captain must, in an emergency, handle or navigate his ship in a seamanlike manner.
Witness Excused.
SENATOR SMITH: I desire to put into the record a memorandum from Capt. Knapp regarding the drift of ice on and near the Grand Banks submitted by the Hydrographic Office May 13, 1912.
The memorandum referred to is here printed in the record as follows:
MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR WILLIAM ALDEN SMITH.
IN RE DRIFT OF ICE ON AND NEAR THE GRAND BANKS.
(Submitted by the Hydrographic Office May 13, 1912.)
1. The Labrador Current, which brings both berg and field ice down past Newfoundland, sweeps across the banks in a generally south to southwest direction, flowing more westerly on its surface as it approaches the warm Gulf Stream water in about latitude 43-degrees, with a set of about 12 miles a day. The speed of the Gulf Stream drift at its northern edge is only about 6 miles a day at the fiftieth meridian and its depth is probably less than 300 feet.
2. An ice field arriving at the edge of the Gulf Stream drift finds itself impelled less and less southward and more and more to eastward and northeastward; but a deeply floating iceberg may continue to plow southward into the warm east­flowing current and end its career south of latitude 40-degrees by melting and breaking up. The reason for this is that the cold, south­moving current actually underruns the warm surface water.
3. The southward progress of icebergs across the Grand Banks is estimated to be a degree in five days, or about 12 miles a day; but it seems to slack up as the warm current near the tail of the bank is approached (lat. 42-degrees to 44-degrees N., long. 49-degrees to 51-degrees W.) Here the icebergs are reported with greatest frequency. This may be because the largest number of passing steamers traverse the region or because the bergs loiter in that vicinity owing to the commingling of the two ocean currents above named.
4. The course of an iceberg in that region could be predicted if the following factors in the problem were known: (a) Vertical section below water, (b) what ratio of the vertical section is in each current (polar and Gulf Stream), (c) direction of each current, (d) velocity of each current. What these factors are must be estimated in each case, varying with each berg according to shape and size, and varying with the location and date to some extent.
5. Not much is known regarding the subsurface current. This should be studied during a hydrographic survey of the banks; at the same time careful observations are needed of the surface currents (direction, velocity, meeting points, temperature, color, etc.). A thorough study of the question is desirable; and it would be possible for a naval vessel to gain much useful information by a season's work in that vicinity (April to August, inclusive). She could also record direct observations of ice movements and act as a radiotelegraph station to warn other ships.
JOHN J. KNAPP, Captain, United States Navy, Hydrographer
SENATOR SMITH: I submit for the record also a letter addressed to Senator Perkins, transmitted to the committee, concerning certain backing trials of the battleships Delaware and North Dakota at the time these vessels were running ahead at about 21 knots speed.
(The letter referred to, together with the letter of transmission of Senator Perkins, is here printed in the record as follows:)
Washington, D.C. May 16, 1912.
Hon. Wm. Alden Smith, Chairman Subcommittee on Commerce to Investigate loss of Steamer "Titanic."
My Dear Senator: Referring to my conversation with you. I beg to hand you herewith the letter which I mentioned that I received from Admiral Cone, Chief of the Bureau of Engineering, United States Navy. I think the information he has given in this letter is quite valuable, and I hope you will be able to make some use of it in your report. Very truly yours. Geo. C. Perkins.
[Inclosure.]
NAVY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF STEAM ENGINEERING,
Washington, D.C., May 8, 1912.
My Dear Senator:
In replying to your letter of May 7, concerning time required to transmit signals from the bridge to the engine room and have them obeyed, I furnish you the following data concerning backing trials of the Delaware and North Dakota at the time these vessels were running ahead at about 21 knots speed. I would estimate the time required to transmit the signal from bridge to engine­room not to exceed 10 seconds. On the collier, Neptune, where the engines can be handled from the bridge, this 10 seconds loss of time would be eliminated.
The backing data for the Delaware is as follows:
Starboard Engines. Port Engines.
Seconds. Seconds.
Signal received to back.....................................0 0
Engines started backing..................................22 10
The ship was dead in the water in 6 minute 56.4 seconds.
Ship at time signal to back was received was making about 21 knots.
The machinery of the Titanic was a combination of reciprocating engines with turbines, with the power distributed on three shafts and developing approximately 50 per cent of the full power. The backing was accomplished only with the reciprocating engines. If we allow that the backing power of these engines was equal to the ahead power, which is not the case, as on account of the effect of the back of the propellers the backing power is always less than the ahead power, the maximum possible backing power of the Titanic could not have exceed 50 per cent of the ahead power. This being the fact, her backing possibilities were more nearly like those of the North Dakota, the turbine vessel, than those of the Delaware, the reciprocating engine ship. As pointed out in the first part of the letter, the probable saving in total time between the desire to back on the bridge and the actual backing in the engine room, which would be accomplished by fitting bridge handling apparatus for the main engines, would probably not exceed 10 seconds.
In the above trails, the North Dakota was handicapped by very bad maneuvering valves. Should her valves have handled as well as the reversing gear of the Delaware, the time to bring her to a dead stop in the water would have been reduced to approximately 5 minutes. I have selected the above vessels to quote on account of their large size, both being Dreadnoughts, and the speed at which they were running when the signal to back was given.
Very respectfully, H. I. Cone, Engineer in Chief, U.S. Navy, Chief of Bureau.
Hon. Geo C. Perkins,
United States Senator, Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, Washington D.C.
SENATOR SMITH: I also submit for the record a memorandum received from Capt. Knapp of the Hydrographic Office regarding the routes traveled by steamers, and having special reference to certain changes in these routes, or tracks, after the accident to the Titanic.
The memorandum referred to is here printed in the record as follows:
MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR WILLIAM ALDEN SMITH, UNITED STATES SENATE.
Hydrographic Office, Navy Department, May 15, 1912.
There is submitted herewith a memorandum on the steamer lanes and the ice question prepared by the Hydrographic Office on April 20, 1912, and published by authority of the Secretary of the Navy, which gives a brief history of the adoption of the steamer lanes.
Following is the chronology of recent events bearing upon the subject of the trans­Atlantic tracks:
January 14, 1912, changed from the accepted northerly set of tracks to the accepted southerly set of tracks (the one upon whose westward route the Titanic was lost). This change has been made annually at the middle of January, and the change from the southerly to the northern lane has been made annually at the middle of August by formal agreement entered into by all of the trans­Atlantic companies in 1898.
April 14, 1912, The Titanic struck ice and sunk in latitude 41-degrees 46-minutes North, longitude 50-degrees 14-seconds West, early April 15.
