One ash ejector was placed in each of the large boiler compartments to work the ash ejectors, and to circulate or feed the boilers as required. This pump was also connected to the bilges, except in the case of three of the boiler rooms, where three of the ballast and bilge pumps were placed. The pumps in each case had direct bilge suctions as well as a connection to the main bilge pipe so that each boiler room might be independent. The remainder of the auxiliary pumps were placed in the reciprocating and turbine­engine rooms. Two ballast pumps were placed in the reciprocating­engine room, with large suctions from the bilges direct and from the bilge main. Two bilge pumps were also arranged to draw from bilges. One bilge pump was placed in the turbine room and one of the hot salt­water pumps had a connection from the bilge main pipe for use in emergency. A 10­inch main ballast pipe was carried fore and aft through the ship with separate connections to each tank, and with filling pipes from the sea connected at intervals for trimming purposes. The five ballast pumps were arranged to draw from this pipe. A double line of bilge main pipe was fitted forward of No. 5 boiler room and aft of No. 1.
GENERAL.
There were four elliptical­shaped funnels; the three forward ones took the waste gases from the boiler furnaces, and the after one was placed over the turbine hatch and was used as a ventilator. The galley funnels were led up this funnel. The uptakes by which the waste gases were conveyed to the funnels were united immediately above the water­tight bulkhead which separated the boiler rooms.
All overhead discharge from the circulating pumps, ballast pumps, bilge pumps, etc., were below the deep load line, but above the light line.
The boilers were supported in built steel cradles, and were stayed to the ship's side and to each other athwart ships by strong steel stays. Built steel chocks were also fitted to prevent movement fore and aft.
Silent blow­offs from the main steam pipes were connected direct to both condensers.
CREW AND PASSENGERS.
When the Titanic left Queenstown on April 11, the total number of persons employed on board in any capacity was 885.
The respective ratings of these persons were as follows:
Deck department 66
Engine department 325
Victualing department 494
885
Eight bandsmen were included in the second­class passenger list.
In the deck department the master, Edward Charles Smith, held an extra master's certificate; Chief Officer H. F. Wilde held an ordinary master's certificate; First Officer W. M. Murdock held an ordinary master's certificate; Second Officer C. H. Lightoller held an extra master's certificate; Third Officer H. J. Pitman held an ordinary master's certificate; Fourth Officer J. G. Boxall held an extra master's certificate; Fifth Officer H. G. Lowe held an ordinary master's certificate; Sixth Officer J. P. Moody held an ordinary master's certificate.
In the engine department were included the chief engineer and 7 senior and 17 assistant engineers.
In the victualing department there were 23 women employed.
The total number of passengers on board was 1,316.
Male Female Total
Of These
First­class 180 145 325
Second­class 179 106 285
Third­class 510 196 706
1,316
Of the above, 6 children were in the first class; 24 children were in the second class; 79 children were in the third class; or 109 in all.
About 410 of the third­class passengers were foreigners, and these, with the foreigners in the first and second class and in the victualing department, would make a total of nearly 500 persons on board who were presumably not English speaking, so far as it is possible to ascertain. The disposition of the different classes of passengers and of the crew in the ship has already been described (pp. 10­15). In all, 2,201 person were on board.
II. ACCOUNT OF THE SHIP'S JOURNEY ACROSS THE ATLANTIC, THE MESSAGES SHE RECEIVED, AND THE DISASTER.
THE SAILING ORDER.
The masters of vessels belonging to the White Star Line are not given any special "sailing orders" before the commencement of any particular voyage. It is understood, however, that the "tracks" or "lane routes" proper to the particular time of the year, and agreed upon by the great steamship companies, are to be generally adhered to. Should any master see fit during this passage to deviate from his route he has to report on and explain this deviation at the end of his voyage. When such deviation has been in the interests of safety, and not merely to shorten his passage, his action has always been approved of by the company.
A book of general ship's rules and uniform regulations is also issued by the company as a guide; there are in this book no special instructions in regard to ice, but there is a general instruction that the safety of the lives of the passengers and ship are to be the first consideration.
Besides the book of ship's rules, every master when first appointed to command a ship is addressed by special letter from the company, of which the following passage is an extract:
You are to dismiss all idea of competitive passages with other vessels and to concentrate your attention upon a cautious, prudent, and ever­watchful system of navigation, which shall lose time or suffer any other temporary inconvenience rather than incur the slightest risk which can be avoided.
Mr. Sanderson, one of the directors, in his evidence says with reference to the letter:
We never fail to tell them in handing them these letters that we do not wish them to take it as a mere matter of form; that we wish them to read these letters, and to write an acknowledgement to us that they have read them, and that they will be influenced by what we have said in those letters.
THE ROUTE FOLLOWED.
The Titanic left Southampton on Wednesday, April 10, and, after calling at Cherbourg, proceeded to Queenstown, from which port she sailed on the afternoon of Thursday, April 11, following what was at that time the accepted outward­bound route for mail steamers from the Fastnet Light, off the southwest coast of Ireland, to the Nantucket Shoal light vessel, off the coast of the United States. It is desirable here to explain that it has been, since 1899, the practice by common agreement between the great North Atlantic steamship companies, to follow lane routes, to be used by their ships at the different seasons of the year. Speaking generally, it may be said that the selection of these routes has hitherto been based on the importance of avoiding as much as possible the areas where fog and ice are prevalent at certain seasons, without thereby unduly lengthening the passage across the Atlantic, and also with the view of keeping the tracks of "outward" and "homeward" bound mail steamers well clear of one another. A further advantage is that, in case of a breakdown, vessels are likely to receive timely assistance from other vessels following the same route. The decisions arrived at by the steamship companies referred to above have, from time to time, been communicated to the Hydrographic Office, and the routes have there been marked on the North Atlantic route charts printed and published by the Admiralty; and they have also been embodied in the sailing directions.
Before the Titanic disaster, the accepted mail steamers outward track between January 15 and August 14 followed the arc of a great circle between the Fastnet Light and a point in latitude 42-degrees N. and 47-degrees W. (sometimes termed the "turning point"), and from thence by Rhumb Line so as to pass just south of the Nantucket Shoal light vessel, and from this point on to New York. This track, usually called the outward southern track, was that followed by the Titanic on her journey.
An examination of the North Atlantic route chart shows that this track passes about 25 miles south (that is outside) of the edge of the area marked "field ice between March and July," but from 100 to 300 miles to the northward (that is inside) of the dotted line on the chart marked, "Icebergs have been seen within this line in April, May, and June."
That is to say, assuming the areas indicated to be based on the experience of many years, this track might be taken as passing clear of field ice under the usual conditions of that time of year, but well inside the area in which icebergs might be seen.
It is instructive here to remark that had the "turning point" been in longitude 45-degrees W. and latitude 38-degrees N., that is some 240 miles to the south­eastward, the total distance of the passage would only have been increased by about 220 miles, or some 10 hours' steaming for a 22­knot ship. This is the route which was provisionally decided on by the great trans­Atlantic companies subsequent to the Titanic disaster.
It must not be supposed that the lane routes referred to had never been changed before. Owing to the presence of ice in 1903, 1904 and 1905 from about early in April to mid­June or early in July, westward­bound vessels crossed the meridian of 47-degrees W. in latitude 41-degrees N., that is 60 miles further south than the then accepted track.
The publications known as "Sailing Directions," compiled by the hydrographic office at the Admiralty, indicate the caution which it is necessary to use in regions where ice is likely to be found.
The following is an extract from one of these books, named "United States Pilot (East Coast)," Part I (second edition, 1909, p. 34), referring to the ocean passages of the large trans­Atlantic mail and passenger steamers:
To these vessels one of the chief dangers in crossing the Atlantic lies in the probability of encountering masses of ice, both in the form of bergs and of extensive fields of solid compact ice, released at the breaking up of winter in the Arctic regions, and drifted down by the Labrador current across their direct route. Ice is more likely to be encountered in this route between April and August, both months inclusive than at other times, although icebergs have been seen at all seasons northward of the parallel of 43-degrees N., but not often so far south after August.
These icebergs are sometimes over 200 feet in heigth and of considerable extent. They have been seen as far south as latitude 39-degrees N., to obtain which position they must have crossed the Gulf Stream impelled by the cold Arctic current and underrunning the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. That this should happen is not to be wondered at when it is considered that the specific gravity of fresh­water ice, of which these bergs are composed, is about seven­eights that of sea water; so that, however vast the berg may appear to the eye of the observer, he can in reality see one­eight of its bulk, the remaining seven­eighths being submerged and subject to the deep­water currents of the ocean. The track of an iceberg is indeed directed mainly by current, so small a portion of its surface being exposed to the action of the winds that its course is but slightly retarded or deflected by moderate breezes. On the Great Bank of Newfoundland bergs are often observed to be moving south or southeast; those that drift westward of Cape Race usually pass between Green and St. Pierre Banks.
The route chart of the North Atlantic, No. 2058, shows the limits within which both field ice and icebergs may be met with, and where it should be carefully looked out for at all times, but especially during the spring and summer seasons. From this chart, it would appear that whilst the southern and eastern limits of field ice are abut latitude 42-degrees N., and longitude 45-degrees W., icebergs may be met with much farther from Newfoundland; in April, May and June, they have been seen as far South as latitude 39-degrees N. and as far east as longitude 38-degrees 30-minutes W.
And again, on page 35:
It is, in fact, impossible to give, within the outer limits named, any distinct idea of where ice may be expected, and no rule can be laid down to insure safe navigation, as its position and the quantity met with differs so greatly in different seasons. Everything must depend upon the vigilance, caution, and skill with which a vessel is navigated when crossing the dangerous ice­bearing regions of the Atlantic Ocean.
Similar warnings as to ice are also given in the "Nova Scotia (Southeast Coast) and Bay of Fundy Pilot" (sixth edition, 1911) which is also published by the hydrographic office.
Both the above quoted books were supplied to the master of the Titanic (together with other necessary charts and books) before that ship left Southampton.
The above extracts show that it is quite incorrect to assume that icebergs had never been encountered or field ice observed so far south, at the particular time of year when the Titanic disaster occurred; but it is true to say that the field ice was certainly at that time farther south than it has been seen for many years.
It may be useful here to give some definitions of the various forms of ice to be met with in these latitudes, although there is frequently some confusion in their use.
An iceberg may be defined as a detached portion of a polar glacier carried out to sea. The ice of an iceberg formed from a glacier is of quite fresh water. Only about an eight of its mass floats above the surface of sea water.
A "growler" is a colloquial term applied to icebergs of small mass, which therefore only show a small portion above the surface. It is not infrequently a berg which has turned over, and is therefore showing what has been termed "black ice" or, more correctly, dark­blue ice.
Pack ice is the floating ice which covers wide areas of the polar seas, broken into large pieces, which are driven ("packed") together by wind and current, so as to form a practically continuous sheet. Such ice is generally frozen from sea water, and not derived from glaciers.
Field ice is a term usually applied to frozen sea water floating in much looser form than pack ice.
An icefloe is the term generally applied to the same ice (i.e., field ice) in a smaller quantity.
A floe berg is a stratified mass of floe ice (i.e., sea­water ice).
ICE MESSAGES RECEIVED.
The Titanic followed the outward southern track until Sunday April 14, in the usual way. At 11:40 p.m. on that day she struck an iceberg and at 2:20 a.m. on the next day she foundered.
At 9 a.m. (Titanic time) on that day a wireless message from the steamship Caronia was received by Capt. Smith. It was as follows:
