Mr. Stone states that the master, who was also up (but apparently not on the bridge) pointed out the steamer to him with instructions to tell him if her bearings altered or if she got any closer; he also stated that Mr. Groves had called her up on the Morse lamp and had received no reply.
Mr. Stone had with him during the middle watch an apprentice named Gibson, whose attention was first drawn to the steamer's lights at about 12:20 a.m. He could see a masthead light, her red light (with glasses), and a "glare of white lights on her afterdeck." He first thought her masthead light was flickering and next thought it was a Morse light, "calling us up." He replied, but could not get into communication, and finally came to the conclusion that it was, as he had first supposed, the masthead light flickering. Sometime after 12:30 a.m., Gill, the donkey man, states that he saw two rockets fired from the ship which he had been observing, and about 1:10 a.m., Mr. Stone reported to the captain by voice pipe, that he had seen five white rockets from the direction of the steamer. He states that the master answered, "Are they company's signals?" and that he replied, "I do not know, but they appear to me to be white rockets." The master told him to "go on Morsing," and when he received any information, to send the apprentice down to him with it. Gibson states that Mr. Stone informed him that he had reported to the master, and that the master had said the steamer was to be called up by Morse light. This witness thinks the time was 12:55; he at once proceeded again to call the steamer up by Morse. He got no reply, but the vessel fired three more white rockets; these rockets were also seen by Mr. Stone.
Both Mr. Stone and the apprentice kept the steamer under observation, looking at her from time to time with their glasses. Between 1 o'clock and 1:40 some conversation passed between them. Mr. Stone remarked to Gibson: "Look at her now, she looks very queer out of water, her lights look queer." He also is said by Gibson to have remarked, "A ship is not going to fire rockets at sea for nothing;" and admits himself that he may possibly have used that expression.
Mr. Stone states that he saw the last of the rockets fired at about 1:40, and after watching the steamer for some 20 minutes more he sent Gibson down to the master.
I told Gibson to go down to the master and be sure and wake him, and tell him that altogether we had seen eight of these white lights like white rockets in the direction of this other steamer; that this steamer was disappearing in the southwest, that we had caller her up repeatedly on the Morse lamp and received no information whatsoever.
Gibson states that he went down to the chart room and told the master; that the master asked him if all the rockets were white, and also asked him the time. Gibson stated that at this time the master was awake. It was five minutes past two, and Gibson returned to the bridge to Mr. Stone and reported. They both continued to keep the ship under observation until she disappeared. Mr. Stone describes this as "A gradual disappearing of all her lights, which would be perfectly naturally with a ship steaming away from us."
At about 2:40 a.m. Mr. Stone again called up the master by voice pipe and told him that the ship from which he had seen the rockets come had disappeared bearing SW. 1/2 W., the last, he had seen of the light; and the master again asked him if he was certain there was no color in the lights. "I again assured him they were all white, just white rockets." There is considerable discrepancy between the evidence of Mr. Stone and that of the master. The latter states that he went to the voice pipe at about 1:15, but was told then of a white rocket (not five white rockets). Moreover, between 1:30 and 4;30, when he was called by the chief officer (Mr. Stewart), he had no recollection of anything being reported to him at all, although he remembered Gibson opening and closing the chart­room door.
Mr. Stewart relieved Mr. Stone at 4 a.m. The latter told him he had seen a ship 4 or 5 miles off when he went on deck at 12 o'clock, and at 1 o'clock he had seen some white rockets, and that the moment the ship started firing them she started to steam away. Just at this time (about 4 a.m.) a steamer came in sight with two white masthead lights and a few lights amidships. He asked Mr. Stone whether he thought this was the steamer which had fired rockets, and Mr. Stone said that he did not think it was. At 4:30 he called the master and informed him that Mr. Stone had told him he had seen rockets in the middle watch. The master said, "Yes, I know; he has been telling me." The master came at once on to the bridge, and apparently took the fresh steamer for the one which had fired the rockets, and said, "She looks all right; she is not making any signals now." This mistake was not corrected. He, however, had the wireless operator called.
At about 6 a.m. Capt. Lord heard from the Virginian that the "Titanic had struck a berg, passengers in boats, ship sinking;" and he at once started through the field ice at full speed for the position given.
Capt. Lord stated that about 7:30 a.m. he passed the Mount Temple, stopped, and that she was in the vicinity of the position given him as where the Titanic had collided (lat. 41-degrees 46-minutes N; long. 50-degrees 14-minutes W. He saw no wreckage there, but did later on near the Carpathia, which ship he closed soon afterwards, and he stated that the position where he subsequently left this wreckage was 41-degrees 33-minutes N.; 50-degrees 1-minutes W. It is said in the evidence of Mr. Stewart that the position of the Californian was verified by stellar observations at 7:30 p.m. on the Sunday evening, and that he verified the captain's position given when the ship stopped (42-degrees 5-minutes N; 50-degrees 7-minutes W.) as accurate on the next day. The position in which the wreckage was said to have been seen on the Monday morning was verified by sights taken on that morning.
All the officers are stated to have taken sights, and Mr. Stewart in his evidence remarks that they all agreed. If it is admitted that these positions were correct, then it follows that the Titanic's position as given by that ship when making the C Q D. signal was approximately S. 16-degrees W. (true), 19 miles from the Californian; and further that the position in which the Californian was stopped during the night, was 30 miles away from where the wreckage was seen by her in the morning, or that the wreckage had drifted 11 miles in a little more than 5 hours.
There are contradictions and inconsistencies in the story as told by the different witnesses. But the truth of the matter is plain. The Titanic collided with the berg at 11:40. The vessel seen by the Californian stopped at this time. The rockets sent up from the Titanic were distress signals. The Californian saw distress signals. The number sent up by the Titanic was about eight. The Californian saw eight. The time over which the rockets from the Titanic were sent up was from about 12:45 to 1:45 o'clock. It was about this time that the Californian saw the rockets. At 2:40 Mr. Stone called to the master that the ship from which he had seen the rockets had disappeared. At 2:20 a.m. the Titanic had foundered. It was suggested that the rockets seen by the Californian were from some other ship, not the Titanic. But no other ship to fit this theory has ever been heard of.
These circumstances convince me that the ship seen by the Californian was the Titanic, and if so, according to Capt. Lord, the two vessels were about 5 miles apart at the time of the disaster. The evidence from the Titanic corroborates this estimate, but I am advised that the distance was probably greater, though not more than 8 to 10 miles. The ice by which the Californian was surrounded was loose ice extending for a distance of not more than 2 or 3 miles in the direction of the Titanic. The night was clear and the sea was smooth. When she first saw the rockets, the Californian could have pushed through the ice to the open water without any serious risk and so have come to the assistance of the Titanic. Had she done so she might have saved many if not all of the lives that were lost.
VI. ­ THE BOARD OF TRADE'S ADMINISTRATION.
The court was invited by the board of trade­­
"to report upon the rules and regulations made under the merchant shipping acts, 1894­1906, and the administration of those acts, and of such rules and regulations so far as the consideration thereof is material to this casualty" (No. 26 of the questions submitted to the court by the board of trade).
Charges were made against the board of trade during the progress of the inquiry of a twofold kind. First, it was said that the board had been negligent in that they had failed to keep up to date their rules and regulations relating generally to the provision of life­saving appliances at sea, and, secondly, it was said that their officials had in the particular instance of the Titanic failed to exercise due care in the supervision of the vessel's plans and the inspection of the work done upon her.
With reference to the first of these charges, it was reduced in the course of the inquiry to a charge of neglect to keep the board's scale for the provision of lifeboat accommodation up to date. The circumstances are these: In March, 1886, the board appointed a departmental committee, consisting of three of their principal officers, to inquire into the question of boats, rafts, and life­saving apparatus carried by seagoing merchant ships. In their report this committee pointed out that, as regards boats for ocean­going steamers carrying large numbers of passengers, the boats would be of little use in saving life (although they might for a time prolong its existence) unless succor were at hand from other ships or from proximity to shore; and speaking with special reference to passenger steam vessels carrying emigrants across the Atlantic to ports on the east coast of North America, they said as follows:
Considering the number of vessels employed in this trade, and the large number of passengers they carry, and also taking into consideration the stormy character of the ocean they have to cross, and the thick and foggy weather encountered, we think this class is the most important of any, and we can not pass over the fact that of late years, this traffic has been carried on with remarkable immunity from loss of life.
The boat accommodation these vessels are forced to carry when sailing with emigrants is regulated by the scale in the passengers act, 1855, which provides for boat accommodation for 216 people as a maximum, so that, supposing a vessel leaves with 1,000 passengers and 200 crew under the present statutory requirements, she need only carry sufficient boat accommodation for 216 of these people. Thus it will be seen that the boats carried by this class of vessels are also quite inadequate as an effectual means of saving life should a disaster happen to a ship with her full complement of passengers on board. We are glad to be able to say that there are many liberal and careful shipowners who do all in their power to provide for the safety of their passengers by equipping their vessels with boats far in excess of the number required by statute. But, at the same time, there are others carrying large numbers of emigrants who do no more than they are required to do by law.
We have gone into this question with reference to this class of vessels very fully, and have visited many of them, and we think that the boats required by act should be increased 100 per cent, and in addition to them that the owners should be induced to carry sufficient collapsible boats and approved rafts, so that each ship shall have sufficient life­saving gear for all on board at any one time, provided, as said before, that no ship need carry more boat accommodation than is sufficient for all on board at that time.
In 1887 a select committee of the House of Commons, of which Lord Charles Beresford was the chairman, was appointed to report on saving life at sea, and they found in their report­­
That many passenger ships could not, without great inconvenience, carry so many of the ordinary wooden boats as would suffice to carry the whole of the passengers and crew with safety in bad weather. Under such circumstances the crew would not be sufficient to man so many boats; nor could they all be got into the water in sufficient time in the event of very rapid foundering. Having regard, however, to the fact that accidents occur probably as often in moderate weather as in bad, and having regard also to the fact that the very cause of the accident frequently incapacitates many of the boats, and to the further fact that an insufficiency of boats undoubtedly tends to cause panic, we are of opinion that all seagoing passenger ships should be compelled by law to carry such boats, and other life­saving apparatus as would in the aggregate best provide for the safety of all on board in moderate weather.
As a result of these reports, the merchant shipping (life­saving appliances) act, 1888, appears to have been passed, under which rules were made by the board of trade at different dates. The merchant shipping act, 1894, repealed the act of 1888, and substituted therefor sections 427 to 431 and the seventeenth schedule of the new act. Under this act (1894) a table showing the minimum number of boats to be placed under davits and their minimum cubic contents was issued by the board. It was dated March 9, 1894, and came into operation on June 1 of that year. This table was based on the gross tonnage of the vessels to which it was to apply, and not upon the numbers carried, and it provided that the number of boats and their capacity should increase as the tonnage increased. The table, however, stopped short at the point where the gross tonnage of the vessels reached "10,000 and upwards." As to all such vessels, whatever their size might be, the minimum number of boats under davits was fixed by the table at 16, with a total minimum capacity of 5,500 cubic feet.
