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RANDOMNESS & COMPLEXITY IN PURE MATHEMATICS
_International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos_,
Vol. 4, No. 1, February 1994
G.J. Chaitin
IBM Research Division
P.O. Box 704
Yorktown Heights, NY
10598, USA
<chaitin@watson.ibm.com>
Abstract
One normally thinks that everything that is true is true for a reason.
I've found mathematical truths that are true for no reason at all. These
__________________________
1Lecture given Thursday 22 October 1992 at a Mathematics - Computer Science
Colloquium at the University of New Mexico. The lecture was videotaped;
this is an edited transcript. Originally published under the title
"Randomness in arithmetic and the decline and fall of reductionism in
pure mathematics" in the June 1993 issue of the Bulletin of the European
Association for Theoretical Computer Science.
1
2
mathematical truths are beyond the power of mathematical reasoning
because they are accidental and random.
Using software written in Mathematica that runs on an IBM
RS/6000 workstation, I constructed a perverse 200-page algebraic e-
quation with a parameter N and 17,000 unknowns:
Left-Hand-Side(N) = Right-Hand-Side(N).
For each whole-number value of the parameter N, ask whether this
equation has a finite or an infinite number of whole number solutions.
The answers escape the power of mathematical reason because they are
completely random and accidental.
This work is an extension of famous results of G"odel and Turing
using ideas from a new field called algorithmic information theory.
1. Hilbert on the axiomatic method
Last month I was a speaker at a symposium on reductionism at Cam-
bridge University where Turing did his work. I'd like to repeat the talk
I gave there and explain how my work continues and extends Turing's.
Two previous speakers had said bad things about David Hilbert. So I
started by saying that in spite of what you might have heard in some
of the previous lectures, Hilbert was not a twit!
Hilbert's idea is the culmination of two thousand years of math-
ematical tradition going back to Euclid's axiomatic treatment of ge-
ometry, going back to Leibniz's dream of a symbolic logic and Russell
and Whitehead's monumental Principia Mathematica. Hilbert's dream
was to once and for all clarify the methods of mathematical reasoning.
Hilbert wanted to formulate a formal axiomatic system which would
encompass all of mathematics.
Formal Axiomatic System
--------->
--------->
--------->
Hilbert emphasized a number of key properties that such a formal
axiomatic system should have. It's like a computer programming lan-
guage. It's a precise statement about the methods of reasoning, the
Randomness & Complexity in Pure Mathematics 3
postulates and the methods of inference that we accept as mathemati-
cians. Furthermore Hilbert stipulated that the formal axiomatic system
encompassing all of mathematics that he wanted to construct should
be "consistent" and it should be "complete."
Formal Axiomatic System
---------> consistent
---------> complete
--------->
Consistent means that you shouldn't be able to prove an assertion
and the contrary of the assertion.
Formal Axiomatic System
---------> consistent A ~A
---------> complete
--------->
You shouldn't be able to prove A and ~A (not A). That would be very
embarrassing.
Complete means that if you make a meaningful assertion you should
be able to settle it one way or the other. It means that either A or not
A should be a theorem, should be provable from the axioms using the
rules of inference in the formal axiomatic system.
Formal Axiomatic System
---------> consistent A ~A
---------> complete A ~A
--------->
Consider a meaningful assertion A and its contrary not A. Exactly
one of the two should be provable if the formal axiomatic system is
consistent and complete.
A formal axiomatic system is like a programming language. There's
an alphabet and rules of grammar, in other words, a formal syntax. It's
a kind of thing that we are familiar with now. Look back at Russell
and Whitehead's three enormous volumes full of symbols and you'll feel
you're looking at a large computer program in some incomprehensible
programming language.
4
Now there's a very surprising fact. Consistent and complete means
only truth and all the truth. They seem like reasonable requirements.
There's a funny consequence, though, having to do with something
called the decision problem. In German it's the Entscheidungsproblem.
Formal Axiomatic System
---------> consistent A ~A
---------> complete A ~A
---------> decision problem
Hilbert ascribed a great deal of importance to the decision problem.
HILBERT
Formal Axiomatic System
---------> consistent A ~A
---------> complete A ~A
---------> decision problem
Solving the decision problem for a formal axiomatic system is giving
an algorithm that enables you to decide whether any given meaningful
assertion is a theorem or not. A solution of the decision problem is
called a decision procedure.
HILBERT
Formal Axiomatic System
---------> consistent A ~A
---------> complete A ~A
---------> decision procedure
This sounds weird. The formal axiomatic system that Hilbert wanted
to construct would have included all of mathematics: elementary
arithmetic, calculus, algebra, everything. If there's a decision proce-
dure, then mathematicians are out of work. This algorithm, this
mechanical procedure, can check whether something is a theorem or not,
can check whether it's true or not. So to require that there be a decision
procedure for this formal axiomatic system sounds like you're asking
for a lot.
However it's very easy to see that if it's consistent and it's complete
that implies that there must be a decision procedure. Here's how you do
Randomness & Complexity in Pure Mathematics 5
it. You have a formal language with a finite alphabet and a grammar.
And Hilbert emphasized that the whole point of a formal axiomatic sys-
tem is that there must be a mechanical procedure for checking whether
a purported proof is correct or not, whether it obeys the rules or not.
That's the notion that mathematical truth should be objective so that
everyone can agree whether a proof follows the rules or not.
So if that's the case you run through all possible proofs in size order,
and look at all sequences of symbols from the alphabet one character
long, two, three, four, a thousand, a thousand and one. . .a hundred
thousand characters long. You apply the mechanical procedure which
is the essence of the formal axiomatic system, to check whether each
proof is valid. Most of the time, of course, it'll be nonsense, it'll be
ungrammatical. But you'll eventually find every possible proof. It's
like a million monkeys typing away. You'll find every possible proof,
though only in principle of course. The number grows exponentially
and this is something that you couldn't do in practice. You'd never get
to proofs that are one page long.
But in principle you could run through all possible proofs, check
which ones are valid, see what they prove, and that way you can sys-
tematically find all theorems. In other words, there is an algorithm,
a mechanical procedure, for generating one by one every theorem that
can be demonstrated in a formal axiomatic system. So if for every
meaningful assertion within the system, either the assertion is a the-
orem or its contrary i