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                                                                                DRUGS, Page 65

Panama -- Just Saying No


Noriega's successors have cracked down on the traffickers, but
the U.S. has not yet won its war against the Latin American
cartels

By DAVID ELLIS -- Reported by Michele Labrut/Panama City and
Elaine Shannon/Washington


    Manuel Antonio Noriega's conviction came at an
exceedingly high price. Washington's eagerness to put Noriega
behind bars occasioned the controversial 1989 invasion of Panama
that took the lives of 23 American soldiers and at least 500
local citizens. The seven-month, multimillion-dollar trial
featured testimony from some 20 dope dealers, pilots and money
launderers, much of it in exchange for reduced sentences, cash
settlements and other favors. And although President Bush hailed
last week's verdict as "a major victory against the drug lords,"
Noriega's conviction is likely to have little lasting effect on
the overall war against the traffickers: cocaine producers in
Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, like the heroin processors in
Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle and Lebanon's Bekaa Valley,
will no doubt continue to ply their lucrative trade.

    The good news is that Panama's democratic leaders, boosted
by $1 billion worth of U.S. aid, have launched a drug crackdown
within their own borders. Panamanian President Guillermo Endara
was sworn into office on a U.S. Army base just hours after the
American invasion, an act that has come to symbolize the close
relationship between the Bush Administration and Noriega's
successor. According to dea officials, Endara's willingness to
cooperate with international antidrug efforts is helping stanch
the flow of cocaine through Panama.

    The country's new 10,500-man civilian police force, which
replaced the corrupt army-officer corps loyal to Noriega, is
getting $20 million worth of U.S. training and equipment. Thanks
to an accord reached last year, American investigators have
access to secret Panamanian bank records whenever they suspect
that accounts are being used to launder drug money. Now that
Panama requires local banks to file meticulous reports on large
deposits of cash, the cartels are no longer able to make
millions of dollars disappear into a financial black hole.
Efforts to set up similar laundering systems in Luxembourg and
Uruguay have been thwarted, and some Latin dealers have been
forced literally to bury their money on their property for
safekeeping.

    Meanwhile, the number of drug seizures in Panama has more
than doubled: nine tons of cocaine were intercepted in 1991,
compared with just under four tons the previous year.
Intensified police surveillance has also spelled bad news for
those who assist the cartels: in the first three months of 1992,
227 traffickers were arrested, in contrast to 102 in the same
period a year ago.

    Some government critics say the statistics merely prove
that the country remains a popular pipeline to the American
drug market. In Noriega's day, Colombian cartels -- which are
responsible for nearly all the cocaine sold in the U.S. --
regularly used neighboring Panama for back-door operations. But
DEA officials dispute that view, arguing that the increased
seizures are the result of successful sting operations. Once
undercover agents infiltrate a drug ring, the agency often tries
to arrange a delivery in Panama City, where the local police
force breaks up the deal.

    While Panama is no longer a drug thug's playground, its
transformation to law-abiding democracy has not been smooth. The
Endara government has already survived one coup attempt, and
there are fears that a fully armed police force might provide
the nucleus for another rebellion led by former army members.
Yet as former police director Ebrahim Asvat points out, "If the
government doesn't show interest in providing the police with
adequate equipment, it can't expect them to be fully efficient."
Moreover, Panama's backlogged legal system has been unable to
bring many drug traffickers to justice. Some 40 military aides
accused of corruption have yet to stand trial.

    Endara himself has been at least tangentially linked with
the drug trade. A corporate lawyer before he became a
politician, he served for years on the board of a bank
controlled by Colombia's Medellin cartel. Endara resigned that
post only after a local newspaper revealed the association a
month after he took office. More troubling still, Endara's law
partners set up several front companies for coke kingpins; U.S.
authorities estimate that these firms handled billions in drug
profits. Endara denies any wrongdoing and any links to the
international narcotics trade in his business dealings.

    The success of the international war on drugs doesn't
concern the average Panamanian. While the country has begun
slowly to recover from the three-year economic crisis triggered
by U.S. sanctions against Noriega, unemployment still hovers
around 20% and street crime is climbing as the police
concentrate on the traffickers. "I don't care about Noriega,"
declares Juan Garcia, 34, a part-time fruit seller who has been
looking for steady work since 1989. "More than anything, I need
a job to feed my family." Though Panama has shed 21 years of
military dictatorship and curtailed the drug trade at home, the
government has yet to prove that it can provide its citizens
with a decent standard of living.