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                                                                                July 22, 1974

The Evidence: Fitting the Pieces Together



     Never in the 25-month history of the Watergate scandal had
so much evidence been brought together in one place. The eight
volumes of material released last week by the House Judiciary
Committee assembled all the available bits and pieces of the
Watergate mosaic: previously secret grand jury testimony
furnished to the committee by Judge John Sirica, memos written by
President Nixon and some of his high aides. Senate Watergate
Committee testimony, tape recordings from the Oval Office, a
presidential Dictabelt, and notes scrawled on legal-size pads in
the President's irregular hand. The Judiciary Committee formed no
conclusions and drew no verdicts. In a serious effort to be fair
and impartial, it simply presented all the materials it had
acquired.

     The overwhelming weight of the evidence is against Nixon,
though there is no single piece of new information that could
conclusively decide the case. There is much ambiguity about
specific words and actions of the President. But the broad
pattern of motives and strategies suggested by the mass of
material leaves little doubt about the major aim of the
President: to protect himself and his aides from the flood of
disclosures that began immediately after the Watergate break-in
on June 17, 1972.

     New evidence assembled by the committee confirms, and in
many instances sharpens, the impressions given by already
published material. The President and his men often judged
possible actions for their publicity value, rarely for their
potential in getting out the complete truth or bringing
individuals to justice. Though the White House insists that the
impeachment inquiry should be limited to the Watergate break-in
and cover-up alone, the committee, beginning this week, will
produce ten more volumes of information on other allegations
against Nixon.

     The President's defense on Watergate is contained in a
separate 242-page volume, which the committee released together
with last week's seven books of evidence. Prepared by
Presidential Lawyer James St. Clair, it is the only portion of
the massive document that attempts to draw specific conclusions.
St. Clair cites Senate Watergate testimony by H.R. Haldeman, John
Ehrlichman and John Mitchell that the President had no knowledge
of the burglary or the cover-up. The defense counsel's main
focus, however, is on the crucial $75,000 payment to E. Howard
Hunt, one of the convicted Watergate conspirators. St. Clair
argues that the transcript of the meeting that Nixon held with
White House Counsel John Dean on March 21, 1973, "clearly
demonstrates that the President recognizes that any blackmail and
cover-up activities then in progress could not continue."

     St. Clair's relatively slender volume of defense is
overshadowed by the seven books of evidence (ranging from 271 to
687 pages). Part 1 of the Judiciary Committee document details
the formation of the "sophisticated intelligence-gathering
system" that eventually led to the Watergate break-in and
bugging. A second volume deals with the initial attempt to limit
the case to the scandal away from the White House. A third
section of two volumes focuses on the hush-money payments to Hunt
and the continued cover-up efforts. The three-volume fourth
section contains material on activities after March 22, 1973,
emphasizing the role of President Nixon -- whether he launched an
investigation or participated in the cover-up himself.

     Herewith the major elements of the evidence:


     The Immediate Cover-Up

     One of the more startling disclosures is that Nixon foresaw
a need to conceal information about the Watergate affair just 13
days after the June 17 break-in. At a meeting with Haldeman and
Mitchell, which was called to discuss Mitchell's resignation as
Nixon's campaign director, this dialogue took place:

     HALDEMAN: Well, there maybe is another facet. The longer you
wait, the more risk each hour brings. You run the risk of more
stuff, valid or invalid, surfacing on the Watergate caper --
type of thin --

     MITCHELL: You couldn't possibly do it if you got into a --

     HALDEMAN: -- the potential problem and then you are stuck --

     PRESIDENT: Yes, that's the other thing, if something does
come out, but we won't -- we hope nothing will. It may not. But
there is always the risk.

     HALDEMAN: As of now there is no problem there. As of any
moment in the future there is at least a potential problem.

     PRESIDENT: Well, I'd cut the loss fast. I'd cut it fast. If
we're going to do it I'd cut it fast.

     It is possible that by "cut the loss" Nixon meant that
Mitchell would have to resign. But in expressing his fear that
some information might "come out," the President seemed already
concerned that an open policy of complete disclosure would be
fraught with danger -- fully nine months before he claims he
first became aware of the Watergate cover-up.

     Less than three weeks after the arrest of the Watergate
wiretappers, the possibility of granting them Executive clemency
was discussed by the President and Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman later
recalled before a Watergate grand jury that he held a "very long,
rambling conversation" with the President on or about July 4,
1972. Testified Ehrlichman: "We talked about the Watergate
defendants, and I raised the point with the President that
presidential pardons or something of that kind inevitably would
be a question that he would have to confront." Ehrlichman added
in his testimony that Nixon expressed the "firm view [that] he
would never be in a position to grant a pardon or any form of
clemency in this case." Despite Ehrlichman's report that Nixon
rejected clemency, the conversation raises a sticky question for
the White House: Why did Ehrlichman feel that the question of
Executive clemency would "inevitably" come up over what was then
being described by Nixon's spokesmen as a "third-rate burglary"?

     That question indeed occurred to an assistant special
Watergate prosecutor, Richard Ben-Veniste. Logically, one
Watergate defendant that the White House should have been worried
about was G. Gordon Liddy, then a fairly high official of the
Committee for the Re-Election of the President. Ehrlichman
testified that he knew by June 20 that Liddy had headed the
Watergate break-in team. Yet Ehrlichman told Ben-Veniste that he
did not inform the President of Liddy's role.

     Q. Now when was the first time that you were aware that the
President was aware that Liddy had an involvement?

     A. I don't know.

     Q. Was he aware of it before the 10th of July, based on your
long and very complete discussions with him on the 6th, 7th, and
8th of July?

     A. I don't know.

     Then, moments later, Ben-Veniste asked incredulously:

     Q. And are you testifying that you were aware of that and
you had conversations with the President about the possibilities
of Executive clemency for these people, and you just omitted to
tell the President that the general counsel for the finance
committee [Liddy] had admitted to Dean that it was his operation?


     Nixon's Involvement Deepens

     The most damaging material concerns the events of March
1973. President Nixon has repeatedly stated that it was only on
March 21 that he first learned, from Dean, of the Watergate
cover-up. There are strong indications in the new evidence that
the President discussed the cover-up at least eight days before
March 21. More incriminating still is material showing that
President Nixon perpetuated the cover-up rather than launching a
complete investigation, as he has frequently claimed he did.

     The Judiciary Committee's version of a March 13 conversation
between Nixon and Dean shows clearly, as do the transcripts
issued by the White House, that the President was then aware of
perjury by Gordon Strachan, Haldeman's top aide. The President on
that day also explicitly rejected the "hang-out road" -- meaning
a complete disclosure.

     The evidence shows that Nixon again discussed the Watergate
cover-up with Dean on March 17. A committee subpoena for the tape
of that conversation was rejected by the White House. But during
a later talk between Nixon and Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler, a
tape of which was obtained by the Judiciary committee, Nixon
recounted that on March 17 he ordered Dean to "cut off any
disclosures that might implicate him in Watergate." The Judiciary
Committee states: "The President said that [the former deputy
campaign director] Jeb Magruder 'put the heat on, and [the former
treasurer of Nixon's finance committee, Hugh] Sloan starts
pissing on Haldeman.'" As the committee report summarizes the
conversation: "The President said that 'we've got to cut that
off. We can't have that go to Haldeman.' The President said that
looking to the future there were problems and that Magruder could
bring it right to Haldeman, and that could bring it to the White
House, to the President. The President said that 'We've got to
cut that back. That ought to be cut out.'"

     The evidence also amplifies the record of the events of the
fateful March 21. A statement made by the President on his
Dictabelt machine just after his meeting with Dean and
transcribed by the Judiciary Committee shows that he admired
those of his aides who lied to investigating groups and had
contempt for those who told the truth. He praised Gordon Strachan
-- who at the time was stonewalling FBI investigators and
Government prosecutors with denials that led later to his
indictment for perjury. In Nixon's words, Strachan was "a real
. . . courageous fellow through all this." By contrast, Nixon
talked of Magruder, who was cooperating with prosecutors, as "a
rather weak man, who had all the appearance of character, but who
really lacks it when the, uh, chips are down."

     Strangely, Nixon began the Dictabelt by saying that March 21
was "relatively uneventful." But he went on to recount his long
conversation with Dean and made a possible damaging statement
about one of the most crucial parts of the Watergate case, E.
Howard Hunt's demand for money. Lawyer St. Clair has argued that,
in his March 21 discussion of a payment to Hunt from campaign
funds, Nixon meant only legal-support payments. But the
President's Dictabelt indicates that this was not so. "Hunt,"
said the President, "needed a hundred and -- thousand [sic]
dollars or so to pay his lawyer and handle other things or he was
going to have some things to say that would be very detrimental
to Colson and Ehrlichman, et al. This, uh, Dean recognizes as
pure blackmail."

     On the Dictabelt, Nixon placed much of the blame for the
whole Watergate imbroglio on Charles Colson, who had recently
resigned as White House special counsel. "Apparently what
happened is that Colson, with Liddy and Hunt in his office,
called Magruder and told him in February to get off his ass and
start doing something about, uh, setting up some kind of an
operation . . . Colson was always pushing terribly hard for
action, and in this instance, uh, pushed so hard that, uh, Liddy
et al following their natural inclinations, uh, went, uh, the
extra step which got them into serious trouble."

     The evidence confirms that Colson did urge Magruder to speak
with Hunt and Liddy, who at the time were promoting the Watergate
break-in plan. But if the President was aware of Colson's
involvement, he seemed anxious to keep others from finding out. A
week after Nixon made the Dictabelt, according to evidence
revealed in the Judiciary Committee's volumes, Nixon instructed
Ehrlichman to inform Richard Kleindienst, then the Attorney
General, that "neither Dean nor Haldeman nor Colson nor I nor
anybody in the White House had any prior knowledge of this
burglary." On March 30, nine days after the President recorded
his suspicions of Colson, Ziegler told reporters: "As we have
said before, no one in the White House had any involvement or
prior knowledge of the Watergate event, and I repeat that
statement again today."

     Ziegler was asked about that pronouncement by a Watergate
grand jury last Feb. 12. His testimony included:

     Q. Did the President tell you to make that statement in
March?

     A. Yes, he did.

     Q. So the President didn't tell you what he had learned on
March 21st [from John Dean] prior to your making the March 30th
statement?

     A. No, he didn't.


     Cover-Up of the Cover-Up

     After the March 21 meeting with Dean, the President and his
top aides spent weeks huddled in strategy sessions, looking for
ways to limit damaging disclosures about Watergate while trying
to give the appearance of exhaustively examining the case. A 15-
minute portion of a March 22 meeting of Nixon, Mitchell and Dean
was entirely left out of the White House transcripts. The
Judiciary Committee transcript of that portion of the meeting
depicts the President in a cover-up frame of mind.

     PRESIDENT: . . . I was going to say, uh, uh, John Dean is,
uh, (unintelligible) got -- put the fires out, almost got the damn
thing nailed down till past the election and so forth. We all
know what it is. Embarrassing God damn thing the way it went, and
so forth. But, in my view, uh, some of it will come out; we will
survive it. That's the way it is. That's the way you've got to
look at it.

     Significantly, when John Dean claimed before the Ervin
committee that Nixon praised his efforts to contain the Watergate
affair, the White House denied that Nixon had done so. The
transcript, however, clearly shows the President complimenting
Dean on his work. In the March 22 conversation, the President
seems still to be looking for a way to "put the fires out"
without making a full disclosure:

     DEAN: We were within a few miles months ago, but, uh,
we're --

     PRESIDENT: The point is, get the God damn thing over with.

     DEAN: That's right.

     PRESIDENT: That's the thing to do. That's the other thing I
like about this. I'd like to get -- But you really would draw the
line on -- But, I know, we can't make a complete cave and have the
people go up there and testify. You would agree on that?

     -- The President stated in August 1973 that he ordered
Ehrlichman to investigate the Watergate case after he learned that
Dean was unable or unwilling to carry out his inquiry. Ehrlichman
testified before the Senate Watergate committee that the orders
came at a noon meeting on March 30. But a White House transcript
for that meeting shows that, in the words of the committee
report, "the only subject discussed was a statement to be issued
by Ziegler at a press briefing." The President, Ehrlichman and
Ziegler did discuss the possibility of going up before the grand
jury but only as a public relations device.

     -- One of the President's handwritten notes shows that he
fretted over the $350,000 shelled out by Frederick LaRue, a former
re-election committee aide, to the Watergate conspirators. "What
will LaRue say he got the 350 for?" wrote the President on April
15, 1973 -- the day when Nixon was told by Prosecutor Henry
Petersen that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were guilty of cover-up
activities. The exact meaning of Nixon's note is unclear. But
apparently he was not thinking that telling the simple truth
would be the best course for LaRue.

     Previously undisclosed evidence reveals a seamy, desperate
attempt to pin the blame for the break-in on a couple of
vulnerable faithful servants of the President. The White House
tried to use Mitchell and Magruder to protect the President and
his top aides. The method: secretly tape separate conversations
with Mitchell and Magruder and then turn their words against
them.

     On April 13, 1973, while Magruder was cooperating with the
prosecutors, he was called by Lawrence Higby, an aide to
Haldeman. According to a transcript of the tape, Higby charged
Magruder with leaking information to two reporters. Magruder
retorted that that was "just ridiculous," but he went on to
implicate both himself and Mitchell: "I've committed perjury so
many times now that I'm, uh, I've got probably a hundred years on
perjury alone." Then he talked about his decision to "make a
clean breast of things." He added: "Of course, he [Mitchell] will
be upset with me because I obviously will implicate John
Mitchell." Finally, Higby extracted from Magruder exactly whom
his testimony would implicate: Dean, Strachan and Mitchell -- but
not Haldeman and not the President.

     This was just what Higby and Haldeman wanted. The next
evening, Ehrlichman told the President: "He [Higby] tape recorded
this thing. Higby handled it so well that Magruder has closed all
his doors now with this tape."

     PRESIDENT: What good will that do, John?

     EHRLICHMAN: Sir, it beats the socks off him if he ever gets
off the reservation.

     "Can you use the tape?" the President wanted to know. After
some discussion, Haldeman said that, according to Washington,
D.C., law, they could.

     Also on April 14 Ehrlichman, at Nixon's request, taped a
conversation with Mitchell. The apparent purpose: to get Mitchell
to admit that he had approved the Watergate break-in and
engineered the original cover-up, and thus take the heat off the
White House. Mitchell took a commercial flight to Washington that
afternoon. Ehrlichman quickly ushered him into his office without
giving him a chance to see the President. Also, Ehrlichman pulled
a chair close to his desk so that Mitchell would be close to the
hidden microphone.

     Nixon, Ehrlichman said, would get the credit if Mitchell
would only confess his guilt to the U.S. Attorney. But Mitchell
proved to be too shrewd to say anything that would incriminate
himself. According to a transcript of his conversation, he denied
his own guilt and accused the White House of responsibility.
"Well let me tell you where I stand," he told Ehrlichman. "Uh,
there is no way that I'm going to do anything except staying
where I am because I'm too far, uh, far out. Uh, the fact of the
matter is that, uh, I got euchred into this thing, when I say, by
not paying attention to what those bastards were doing, and uh,
well, you know how far back this goes . . . this . . . whole
genesis of this thing was over here -- as you're perfectly
aware."

     That put Ehrlichman, who knew the meeting was being recorded
on the immediate defensive. "No, I didn't know that," he replied.


     Some Light on the Origins

     The Judiciary Committee evidence shed a bit of light on the
origins of Watergate by recounting some of the practices, power
relationships and internal rivalries in the Nixon political camp
during the months before the break-in and cover-up. What is clear
is that the White House kept the tightest control over even the
smallest details of President Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign.

     The control was exercised by Haldeman. He gave his orders to
Strachan, his liaison at the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President, who is currently under indictment for covering up the
Watergate burglary. A lot of ordinary and extraordinary campaign
decisions were made through a long series of "Political Matter"
memos that Haldeman got from Strachan; Haldeman indicated a
preferred course of action in specific situations by placing the
initial H next to an alternative.

     In the memo dated Dec. 2, 1971, with which the evidence
begins, Strachan mentioned that "the Attorney General [Mitchell]
discussed with John Dean the need to develop a political
intelligence capability. Sandwedge [a previously considered plan]
has been scrapped." In a memo four days later, Haldeman approved
a pay raise, from $26,000 to $30,000, for Liddy, who had just
shifted over from his job as an Ehrlichman aide to handle
political intelligence and legal mattes for the re-election
committee. In these and later memos, Haldeman approved such
trivia as the idea of starting a tabloid for the campaign to get
news to the organization, and the request by Maurice Stans, the
re-election committee's finance chief, for permission to eat in
the White House mess. Haldeman accepted without comment the news
that Political Adviser Harry Dent had counseled that President
Nixon could break "without undue political flak" an unwritten
promise to National Urban League Chief Whitney Young that the
Veterans Administration would create $9 million worth of jobs for
blacks. Dent had recommended, Strachan, reported, that the funds
be used instead for recruiting blacks "who can deliver for the
President on Nov. 7, 1972."

     Several memos deal with a sensitive topic -- money. Both
Haldeman and Strachan used the same slang as the underworld when
discussing finances. Zeroes were dropped from large sums; cash is
called "green." Wrote Strachan: "Of the 1.2 fund Kalmbach has a
balance of 900 [meaning $900,000]-plus under his personal
control." Strachan presented to Haldeman the recommendation of
Stans, Dean and Herbert Kalmbach, the president's private lawyer
and a major fund raiser, that "690" be put in legal committees
and that "only the 230 green would be held under Kalmbach's
personal control." Haldeman approved with his "H," and in a
handwritten note at the bottom of the page told Strachan to "make
it 350 green and hold for us."

     No theme emerged from the evidence with more regularity than
that of hear no evil. When Sloan, the treasurer of the
re-election campaign, asked Stans about Liddy's request for
$83,000, Stans replied: "I do not know what's going on in this
campaign and I don't think you ought to try to know." And when
Liddy, depressed because his plan for the burglary seemed to be
getting nowhere, approached Dean early in 1972, Dean gave him a
moral stiff-arm: "Well, Gordon, you recall that we're not going
to talk about that."