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- VIRUS-L Digest Wednesday, 16 Nov 1988 Volume 1 : Issue 10
-
- Today's Topics:
- Cryptoviruses
- Viruses in VM/CMS
- Re: Security@Aim.Rutgers.Edu -- has anyone seen it?
- hiring virus writers and evil hackers
- ramifications
- Viruses in Military Computers
-
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Date: Tue, 15 Nov 88 19:22 EST
- From: Lynn R Grant <Grant@DOCKMASTER.ARPA>
- Subject: Cryptoviruses
-
- There are several crypto packages on the market that implement the DES
- algorithm on PCs. A couple that come to mind are "Codename: Password"
- and I believe Sidekick (I may have the name wrong). I have been
- thinking (and worrying) lately about how a virus could exploit these
- packages to make itself very painful to remove. Here is how it would
- work:
-
- The virus would go along, propagating itself in the normal way, but it
- would recognize when it had attached itself to the crypto program. It
- would then modify the encryption tables slightly in a reversable way,
- so that encrypted things could be decrypted (in DES, the IP and IP-1
- tables would probably be the most appropriate targets). It would then
- have to know if files were encrypted the old (good) or new (bad) way.
- If there is some kind of a crypto header in the file, it could stuff
- the information in an unused bit; or maybe it could do it based on
- date.
-
- Anyway, if you decrypted an old file, it would work fine, and if you
- encrypted a new file then decrypted it, it would work fine. But
- suppose you discovered the virus, and re-installed all your software
- to ensure that your system was clean. Suddenly all the files you had
- encrypted after the initial attack of the virus would be garbage. If
- you put back the virus-laden version of the crypto package, you could
- get at your files, but the virus could continue to spread.
-
- Of course, on a system where gurus were available, it would be
- possible to compare the infected and uninfected versions of the crypto
- package, disassemble the changes, and come up with the necessary zaps
- to make a crypto package that would decrypt the damaged files without
- propagating the virus. A system with only non-technoid users would
- not have this option. (And if the virus chose its modifications to
- the crypto tables randomly when it first infected the crypto package,
- it would make it hard for a central support organization, or the
- VIRUS-L forum, or whatever, to provide all the crypto users with
- patches to decrypt the damaged files.)
-
- I must admit that most of my experience with computers and DES has
- been on large mainframes (IBM MVS and VM), so I may have overlooked
- something that would make this attack less of a concern, but if I
- have, I don't see it. (I guess that's what overlooking's all about.)
-
- Lynn Grant
- Technical Consultant
- Computer Associates International, Inc.
-
- Disclaimer: These are my opinions, not those of my employer.
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: 16 November 1988, 01:00:06 ECT
- From: Stig Hemmer HEMMER at NORUNIT
- Subject: Viruses in VM/CMS
-
- This discussion started in ETHICS-L, but I think it should be
- continued in VIRUS-L.
-
- Somebody mentioned the Christmas Card 'virus'. I would just like to
- mention the really BIG security hole in VM/CMS. The CCv did not use
- this hole, but if it had it would have been MUCH worse.
-
- VM/CMS has a 'feature' that when a program returns to toplevel
- anything left on the program stack will be parsed as commands. Pretty
- useful sometimes but it makes possible some hideous bugs and security
- holes.
-
- RECEIVE EXEC has such a bug, if a spoolfile is of incorrect format
- RECEIVE may leave part of it on the stack upon exit. SENDFILE or NOTE
- will never make such a file of course, but more low level commands
- make it possible. I don't know any more details (and wouldn't publish
- them anyway), but the cure is simple:
-
- Insert a MAKEBUF in the start and a DROFBUF in the end(s) of RECEIVE.
- (Be careful though not to change the effekt of the STack option.)
- Everybody should use M/D in their programs as it makes them infinitely
- more robust.
- -Tortoise
-
- PS: DISCARD uses RECEIVE but I think (and hope!) that it is more
- robust.
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Tue, 15 Nov 88 21:16:19 EST
- From: msmith@topaz.rutgers.edu (Mark Robert Smith)
- In-Reply-To: "shafferj@amethyst.bucknell.edu"'s message of Mon,
- 14 Nov 88 23:16:30 est
- Subject: Re: Security@Aim.Rutgers.Edu -- has anyone seen it?
-
- Hobbit, who moderates that list, has been busy working on the big move
- from the vax AIM.RUTGERS.EDU to a Sun PYRITE.RUTGERS.EDU, which is now
- aliased to AIM. He says that the list will re-awaken when he gets
- done with the move. Mark
-
- - ----
-
- Mark Smith (alias Smitty) "Be careful when looking into the distance,
- RPO 1604; P.O. Box 5063 that you do not miss what is right under your nose."
- New Brunswick, NJ 08903-5063 {backbone}!rutgers!topaz.rutgers.edu!msmith
- msmith@topaz.rutgers.edu R.I.P. Individual Freedoms - 11/8/88
-
- [Ed. Thanks for the update!]
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Tue, 15 Nov 88 15:17:10 EST
- From: Jefferson Ogata (me!) <OGATA@UMDD>
- Subject: hiring virus writers and evil hackers
-
- Not all evil hackers are meet for hiring. Morris at any rate would
- not be a prime candidate, despite his successful attack, because the
- attack mode was not the result of his own research, nor was his code
- particularly excellent. Apparently the debug hole was revealed to him
- by other sources, so there is no evidence he is a wonderfully clever
- hacker. Burleson also is not a candidate; he simply planted an evil
- program in his former employer's computers. Once again, no evidence
- of extreme cleverness.
-
- Evil hackers can be hired by major companies if the following two
- constraints are met: the hacker has, through his own initiative and
- intellect, explored security holes or bugs that were not widely known;
- the hacker himself has not become famous.
-
- The first constraint simply means that there is no practical reason
- for a company to take any risk with someone who ain't that smart.
-
- The second constraint is very important, and is the reason why you
- won't see publicly known hackers getting great security jobs.
- Ignoring this constraint would promote the image that anyone could get
- a great job by being an evil hacker. There is apparently enough
- incentive for this kind of behavior already; if employers increased
- the incentive, they would merely be complicating their own hiring
- process.
-
- One other reason why Morris hasn't got a chance at getting hired is
- that the media has portrayed him essentially as a wimp. Everything
- they've described about him implies that he's a man with no balls.
- Real evil hackers have got to have balls.
-
- I wish people would stop trying to inject morality and ethics into the
- question of whether hackers should get good jobs. The question is not
- 'should'; it is 'will', and morality has nothing to do with it; it's
- called economics. Part of being a successful business is knowing when
- to take a risk. Ethics are only an issue when the public finds out
- about it.
-
- - - Jeff Ogata
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Tue, 15 Nov 88 18:39:14 EST
- From: "Homer W. Smith" <CTM@CORNELLC>
- Subject: ramifications
-
-
- With all due respect, Mr Doug Hunt could not be more wrong.
-
- Those of us who have some small access to memories of our past
- lives have learned that people do to others what was done to them.
-
- People who fervently believe that criminals should be executed
- were criminals themselves in a past life and were executed. In this
- life they are self righteous upstanding citizens who have 'never lived
- before and would NEVER have done such a thing.'
-
- When we incarcerate people or ruin their lives for 'crimes
- against the empire' we punish them and satisfy our hurts by doing so,
- and maybe we scare those who would follow in their footsteps, but we
- always fail to extract the amends from such people that they owe us
- and must give in order to be rehabilitated.
-
- I would be proud to have Mr. Morris as a security expert for our
- nation as long as the proper amends is allowed to take its course.
- Amends does not mean I break your toy because you broke my toy. Two
- broken toys is two broken toys. Then we BOTH owe amends to society.
-
- The road to hell is NOT paved with good intentions. That is just
- Christian/Creationist double junk and they know it. THESE people who
- rant and rave in such a way are a FAR GREATER danger to our national
- security than Mr. Morris. They are just jealous as hell that Mr.
- Morris is brighter than they are and could undermine their computer
- defenses while scribbling on napkins over morning coffee.
-
- God does not approve of a society that produces criminals or can
- not handle them once they produce themselves. God can handle them.
- Why can not we? Have we bought the line that some people SHOULD not
- be handled? Or that some people CAN NOT be handled? Or that God does
- not WANT us to handle them? Rubbish. Especially for someone like
- Morris who is clearly very far from the pit. Probably farther from
- the pit than the American Government themselves in their dealings with
- the world at large.
-
- Why punish when you can salvage? Surely Morris is salvagable.
- (Don't tell me I am a bleeding heart Liberal. I voted for Bush. If
- you want to worry about viruses, worry about HIM.)
-
- Morris needs to make amends. Not by having his toys broken
- because he broke ours, but by what ever means necessary so that we can
- feel resolved about the matter and in some sense be glad it happened
- with no lingering resentments or bitterness, and most importantly in a
- way that society can feel safe trusting Morris with the run of the
- land again. [Ed. Any (hypothetical, of course) suggestions?]
-
- Placing Morris in jail or ruining his career may satisfy the
- stone cold hearts of some but it wont make a better land for any of
- us. The Eternal NAME is not SHAME.
-
-
- Homer Wilson Smith
-
- Hubbard Fractal Research Laboratory
- Cornell National Supercomputer Facility
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Tue, 15 Nov 1988 15:30:05 EST
- From: Gabriel Basco <GJB100C@ODUVM>
- Subject: Viruses in Military Computers
-
- I was wondering. There might be a possiblity there is a bug in one of
- the fire-control programs that might just start working when a real
- threat appears. Is it possible and can be done against it?
-
- [Ed. I would think that's what they do drills for. In a (properly
- planned) drill, the computer (or other controlling agent) would truly
- believe that it is the real thing. Comments?]
-
- ------------------------------
-
- End of VIRUS-L Digest
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