home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Hacker 2
/
HACKER2.mdf
/
virus
/
virusl2
/
virusl2.162
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1995-01-03
|
15KB
|
333 lines
VIRUS-L Digest Thursday, 27 Jul 1989 Volume 2 : Issue 162
Today's Topics:
Saratoga and Icelandic viruses (PC)
National virus research centres
Ashar variant of Brain virus (PC)
Robert T. Morris, Jr. indicted for Internet Worm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 89 09:55:50 -0000
From: David.J.Ferbrache <davidf@CS.HW.AC.UK>
Subject: Saratoga and Icelandic viruses (PC)
Message forwarded for BCVRC,
I have recently received copies of two viruses, referred to as the
"Saratoga" virus and the "Icelandic" virus. They are clearly minor
variants of the same program, and the evidence is that the Saratoga virus
was observed and collected in California some months previous to the
appearance of the Icelandic. For this reason I shall refer to the latter
as the Icelandic variant of the Saratoga virus.
The actual differences are three:
1. The Icelandic variant has five extra lines of code which check
the segment of the Int 13H vector. The virus is only installed
if this segment is that of the BIOS (0F000H) or of DOS (0700H).
This is obviously an ill-considered addition as, if this vector
had not been taken over by DOS, this test would preclude any
machine with a hard disk (the target of the virus).
2. The four-byte signature on the Saratoga virus is "PooT". This
has been changed to the hex string 18 44 19 5F in the variant.
3. The infection count has been changed from one in two to one in
ten in the variant.
The procedure of making the host program an exact number of paragraphs
(divisible by sixteen) before infection is not unique to this virus, it is
a normal and necessary characteristic of any virus which infects EXE files.
The infective length of the virus is 642 bytes, or 656 for the variant, but
this length will appear to vary because of the above-mentioned rounding up
of the length of the host program.
Although I can find no errors in the code to explain it, I have not been
able to induce either version to mark a cluster as bad on a 32 meg hard
disk.
Joe Hirst
British Computer Virus Research Centre
12 Guildford Street Brighton
East Sussex BN1 3LS England
Telephone: Domestic 0273-26105
International +44-273-26105
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 89 09:56:25 -0000
From: David.J.Ferbrache <davidf@CS.HW.AC.UK>
Subject: National virus research centres
Message forwarded for BCVRC,
Virus Research Centres.
There is a need for research centres in the computer virus field, organised
on a national or sub-national basis and with international links with other
such centres. These centres will:
Collect and catalogue viruses.
Disassemble and otherwise analyze viruses.
Disseminate information and, where appropriate, viruses and
disassemblies to other researchers nationally.
Disseminate information, viruses and disassemblies to researchers at
other centres internationally.
Disseminate information from other centres where appropriate.
Produce various support programs.
It is recognised that many of the researchers associated with these centres
will be writing anti-virus software commercially, but this should not
preclude the free exchange of such information.
Each centre must make its own decisions about funding and charges nationally,
but it is not expected that centres will charge other centres.
A complex international structure is unnecessary, all that is needed is that
each centre:
Recognise other centres.
Respond positively to requests for information and samples from other
centres.
Take the initiative in distributing samples to other centres when new
viruses or variations appear.
Any individual or group who is interested in participating, either nationally
or internationally, and who feels qualified to do so, is invited to contact
the author.
The British Computer Virus Research Centre.
It was hoped that CoTRA (the Computer Threat Research Association) would
fulfil the role as outlined above for Britain. This now seems unlikely and
undesirable for a number of reasons which would be out of place in this
document.
Accordingly the British Computer Virus Research Centre has been founded. We
intend to specialise in high quality virus disassemblies, and in virus
simulation programs.
The simulation programs make it possible to demonstrate the non-infective
features of viruses without either infecting a machine or giving a virus to a
possibly inexperienced user.
Our aim will be to produce disassemblies which cannot be improved upon. In
practical terms this is probably impossible, and we will never accept that
any particular disassembly cannot be improved.
We will always be interested to see disassemblies done by other researchers,
but it is our practice to do our own disassembly first.
>From time to time we will issue descriptive lists of viruses in our
possession, and we welcome samples of viruses which are not on this lists, or
differ in any way. Such samples should ideally consist of an infected file
(for Parasitic viruses) or disk (for Boot viruses).
Joe Hirst
British Computer Virus Research Centre
12 Guildford Street Brighton
East Sussex BN1 3LS England
Telephone: Domestic 0273-26105
International +44-273-26105
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 89 09:55:01 -0000
From: David.J.Ferbrache <davidf@CS.HW.AC.UK>
Subject: Ashar variant of Brain virus (PC)
Message forwarded for the BCVRC,
I have now had an opportunity to examine the version of Brain which Alan
Solomon refers to as 'Ashar'.
The differences are not sufficient to warrant a new name, and the further
confusion (in an already confused field) that this would create. This IS
Brain, but a version which creates a different label on a disk.
Description of differences.
The assumption is made in this description that the version which produces
a label of ' (c) ashar ' is the changed version. This assumption has been
made purely to aid description, although I hope to show that this is the
more valid conclusion.
The actual differences within the code are:
1. In three different places the code to initialise the disk
sub-system is done before attempting to read or write instead of
after an error has occurred.
2. The code to divert a read of the boot sector to the stored copy
is no longer present.
3. The very complex routine to create the volume label is no longer
present, and a much simpler routine is in its place which creates
the label ' (c) ashar '.
4. The search of directory entry starts with the first entry and
includes all of them, instead of starting with the third and not
including the last two.
5. The search for free clusters starts with cluster 2 (the first)
instead of with cluster 55.
There are other differences, but these are trivial (e.g. a switch no longer
exists).
Other differences are in embedded but unreferenced text strings:
1. The primary text string on the boot sector is different in two
places, although we already have other variations for one of
these. This text string in the closest previous version read:
DB 'Welcome to the Dungeon (c) 1986 D.C.L', 17H, '&'
DB ' Amjads (pvt) Ltd VIRUS_SHOE RECORD v9.0 '
DB 'Dedicated to the dynamic memories of millions of'
DB ' virus who are no longer with us today - Thanks '
DB 'GOODNESS!! BEWARE OF THE er..VIRUS : \thi'
DB 's program is catching program follows after'
DB ' these messeges..... $#@%$@!! '
The first two lines of this now read:
DB 'Welcome to the Dungeon (c) 1986 ashar &'
DB ' ashars (pvt) Ltd VIRUS_SHOE RECORD '
2. In two different locations the string:
DB '(c) 1986 Brain & Amjads (pvt) Ltd '
has been changed to:
DB '(c) 1986 ashar & ashars (pvt) Ltd '
The locations are offset 202H and 355H, although the second
offset becomes 305H in the modified version.
3. The string ' (c) Brain $' at offset 4A6H has been removed.
Finally there are minor differences in unreferenced area which appear to be
random rubbish (e.g. the area at the end of the first sector).
Interpretation.
It is fruitless to speculate about whether the 'VIRUS_SHOE' version or the
'telephone number' version is the earlier or original one. Even a
confession by the author of the virus would now be suspect. Certainly the
popular story of the origin of this virus has all the hallmarks of a modern
fantasy, and can be discounted as irrelevant.
I shall consider only whether this version is a rewrite of the 'VIRUS_SHOE'
version, or vice versa as suggested by Alan Solomon.
None of the evidence is conclusive, but such indications as there are
clearly suggest that what we have is a new modification.
The changes to the unreferenced strings do not include a change to the
lengths, although one of these is now in a different location. This
suggests that these changes were made separately to the virus via a disk
editor, before the virus was disassembled to make the other changes.
Initialising the disk sub-system before attempting to read or write is the
more orthodox practice. A conventional programmer might well wish to
conform to 'standard', but it is difficult to believe that a programmer
would bother to change this to the alternative method.
If a pseudo company name is to be created, implying two brothers (or other
close family tie), the probable result would be 'ashar & ashar'. The most
feasible explanation for the final 's' is that it was already there, and
therefore easier to leave as 'ashar & ashars'. This is consistent with
this change having been done before disassembly.
Similarly, the spacing in the 'VIRUS_SHOE' version around the sub-string
'v9.0' is too consistent for it to be a later addition - particularly as
there is no apparent reason for the corresponding gap in the 'ashar'
version.
The rest of the changes are tied together. The Brain virus is filled with
misdirection concerning the volume label. The embedded string at offset
4A6H appears to be the label as used. Changing it will not affect the
virus. The next thing a close examination might reveal is the encrypted
' (c) ashar ' immediately before the other string. This is obviously not
the label either. I have seen a number of otherwise competent programmers
foxed by the actual label routine. The label is embedded in code which is
executed, but does very little, before it is used as data. It is my belief
that having been disappointed twice, and having failed to discover the
label, the programmer ripped out everything he (or she) did not understand.
This included the redirection of the read to the boot sector, and the way
that room has been left for the DOS system files in both the FAT and the
directory.
Joe Hirst
British Computer Virus Research Centre
12 Guildford Street Brighton
East Sussex BN1 3LS England
Telephone: Domestic 0273-26105
International +44-273-26105
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 89 09:04:28 -0400
From: Kenneth R. van Wyk <krvw@SEI.CMU.EDU>
Subject: Robert T. Morris, Jr. indicted for Internet Worm
Forwarded from various lists:
By James Rowley
Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) A Cornell University graduate student blamed
for a rogue computer program that infected as many as 6,000 computers
with an electronic virus was indicted today on a felony computer-crime
charge.
Robert Tappan Morris was indicted by a federal grand jury in
Syracuse, N.Y., on one count of accessing without authorization at
least six computers in which the federal government has an interest.
Morris, who has been criticized by a Cornell University
commission that investigated last November's computer virus incident,
is the first person to be charged under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986, the Justice Department said in a statement released here.
Morris, who is on leave from Cornell, could face a possible
five-year sentence and a $250,000 fine if convicted of the charge. He
could also be required to pay restitution to universities and military
bases where computers were paralyzed by the virus.
Morris has told friends he created the virus but didn't intend
for it to invade computers around the country. The virus infected as
many as 6,000 university and military computers on the nationwide
ARPANET network, which is used by universities and military
contractors to transmit non-classified data.
The network was virtually shut down for several days, although
no information stored in computers was lost.
The indictment charged that Morris ``intentionally and without
authorization'' accessed computers located at the University of
California at Berkeley; the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration in Moffett Field, Calif.; Purdue University in West
Lafayette, Ind.; the U.S. Air Force Logistics Command at Wright
Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, and others not specified.
By accessing these computers, Morris ``prevented the
authorized use of one or more of these federal interest computers and
thereby caused a loss to one or more others'' of more than $1,000, the
indictment charged.
The indictment did not specify how much damage was caused by
the computer virus.
------------------------------
End of VIRUS-L Digest
*********************
Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253