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1992-09-26
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***************************************************************
*** CuD, Issue #1.17 / File 2 of 6 / From the Mailbag ***
***************************************************************
----------------
The following was forwarded from Telecom Digest
----------------
Date: Wed, 13 Jun 90 11:03:34 CDT
From: Doug Barnes <ibmchs!auschs!chaos.austin.ibm.com!dbarnes@cs.utexas.edu>
Message-Id: <9006131603.AA00208@chaos.austin.ibm.com>
To: @auschs.uucp:ibmchs!cs.utexas.edu!eecs.nwu.edu!telecom
Although I have not been directly affected by this operation, it has loomed
very large in my life. I'm an Austin, TX resident, I know many of the
principals who *have* been directly affected, and I've experienced
first-hand some of the chilling effects that the operation has had on
freedom of expression and freedom of association among the usenet and bbs
communities here in Austin.
First of all, some simple math will tell you that if evidence was seized in
26 places, only a handfull of the seizures have been publicized. In two
cases of people I know personally, there was no direct participation with
the LoD, equipment was seized, and the equipment owners sufficiently
terrified by the prospect of further victimization that they have avoided
publicity. Let's face it; even if over $30,000 of equipment has been seized
from someone, that's peanuts compared to court costs and possible
career-damaging publicity from being connected to this mess.
The next layer of damage is to operators of systems even less involved, but
who want to avoid having their house broken into, their equipment seized,
and their reputation besmirched. (If the SS has come to call, then surely
you're guilty of *something*, right?) The solution? Restrict or eliminate
public access to your system. And give me a break, Mr. Townson; if a system
has any reasonable volume and the administrator has any sort of a life,
then that administrator is not going to be reading people's personal mail.
It's semi-reasonable to expect some monitoring of public areas, but not on
a prior review basis...
Then there's the hard-to-quantify suspicion that brews; if being associated
with "crackers" can lead to that early morning knock, (even if that
association has nothing to do with cracking, say, an employer-employee
relationship), then how does that square with freedom of association? Does
the operator of a usenet feed have to run an extensive security check on
anyone who calls for news? How about the operator of a computer store who
hires a salesman? Do any of these people deserve to have their computers,
their disks, their manuals, their modems seized because they have "been
associated with" a "known" cracker?
Although the crackdown has not been as bad as it could have been, allowing
the SS to get away with it would set a most unfortunate precedent.
Douglas Barnes
===========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Jun 90 17:08 EDT
From: Stephen Tihor <TIHOR@NYUACF>
Subject: Outreach..advice sought
To: tk0jut2
My university already has one summer program for bright high school
students but I am looking to see what we can and should do to provide a
legitimate opertunity for youngsters who might become crackers to learn and
to help socialize their urges to explore and expand their world view
without attracting electronic vandals.
Although the computer center is receptive to student initiated projects and
requests for talks or training on any subject few students take advantage
of our offers. Some of our efforts (such as universal email only accounts
on request) have been thwarted by the central administration concerns about
the potentially hugh costs of the project. We have been proceding more
slowly to demonstrate that most members of the university community don't
care yet.
I am interested in ideas with low $ and personel costs and which will avoid
triggering more vandalism or even unguided explorations. Innocent mistakes
made by users "sharing resources" have been almost as much trouble as the
vandals so we can not simply take the Stallman approach and remove all
passwords from the university.
===========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Jun 90 11:54:57 EDT
From: mis@seiden.com(Mark Seiden)
re CuD 1.14:
<5. What happens, as occasionally does, if an attorney asks the moderators
<of CuD for a copy of Phrack #22 or the E911 file? If we send it, have we
<committed a crime? If the recipient accepts it has a second crime occured?
presumably there a precise legal definition of "traffic"?
<It seems that federal agents are not particularly interested in clarifying
<these issues. It leaves the status of distribution of information in limbo
<and turns the "chilling effect" into a sub-zero ice storm. Perhaps this is
<what they want. It strikes us as quite irresponsible.
Exactly how have they been asked to clarify these issues?
Are you still able/willing to make the entire archives available to, say,
counsel needing access for trial preparation? how about to someone who
will be testifying before Congress (who are holding hearings in mid-July on
this subject)?
Does the chilling effect extend so far that defendants will find themselves
denied access to resources they need to prepare a proper defense (while the
government remains resourceful as always) and debate over public policy is
stifled because relevant information cannot be revealed?
A separate query: does anyone have in postable form the texts of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Wire Fraud sections of USC so maybe us
ordinary asses can figure out how this game of "pin the tail on the donkey"
can be played?
mis@seiden.com
===========================================================================
Date: Sat, 16 Jun 90 15:59:16 -0500
From: BKEHOE@widener
Subject: On the counts held against Riggs & Neidorf
To: tk0jut2,
In reading the official transcript {of Craig Neidorf's indictment--eds.}, I
found myself realizing a few things:
1) The way the counts read on the transmission of the E911 file along with
the Phrack files, it opens up an interesting hole--if they are being
charged with the fact that it was illegal to transmit such a file, then
what of the people (from Rich Andrews at Jolnet to the Postmaster at
Missouri) that were, albeit indirectly, also transmitting that file? Should
they too be charged with having committed a crime? If not, then how can
Riggs & Neidorf be charged, if it's not a crime? Murky water.
2) Counts 3 and 4 were about as vague as anything I've read. From my
interpretation, the counts are charging them with conspiring to perform the
E911 "theft" via email. Does that then mean that if I were to write to
someone with a scheme to break into a system somewhere, that I could be
held accountable for my plans? Is the discussion of performing an illegal
act of and in itself illegal?
4) Finally, I must wonder how many more charges may be pulled up between
now and the time of the trial, if that gem about transmitting Phrack 22 was
so suddenly included. Will every Phrack be dug through for any "possibly"
illegal information?
Something's rubbed me wrong ever since Operation SunDevil first started
moving its gears. The trade of information is turning out to be the
mainstay of our society; the amazing boom of fax machines and CD-ROM
storage of volumes of information attribute to that fact. So now all of a
sudden we are hit with the dilemma of deciding what information should and
shouldn't be made available to the "general public", and who should
disseminate that information. If I were to write up a file based on the
information in Dave Curry's Unix Security paper, using language that
"incites devious activity" (a.k.a. encourages people to go searching for
holes in every available Unix system they can find), can I be held
accountable for providing that information? How much of it is based on the
ethical & legal value of the situation, and how much of it is the result of
the "witch hunt" mentality?
One more thing...I know that it's like beating a dead horse, and that it's
become a well-founded part of the American vernacular, but I still don't
like to see the term 'hacker' defined so concretely as was in this
indictment. Sure, the definition's been encouraged over the past decade or
so; I think it still puts a bad light on anyone that finds a fascination
with computers & the world focused around them.
Well, that's enough for now...I'm interested in hearing other peoples'
opinions on all of this. I'm sure I'm not the only one out here who gets
mildly PO'd each time I hear about a new result of Operation Sun Devil (and
the associated fever).
--Brendan Kehoe (bkehoe@widener.bitnet) -- Sun Systems Manager c 40
===========================================================================
Date: Sun, 17 Jun 90 20:46:27 -0400
From: adamg@world.std.com(Adam M Gaffin)
To: tk0jut2%niu.BITNET@cunyvm.cuny.edu
Subject: forum invitation
Commenting on Operation Sun Devil and Mitch Kapor's efforts, Sanford
Sherizen, a computer-security consultant in Natick, Mass, told the
Middlesex News (Framingham, Mass) that he is worried both by the potential
for excessive government zeal in going after computer criminals and by the
attitude that hackers have a right to go wherever their keyboards can gain
them entry.
``I would hope this would not turn into an argument over whether
hackers are good or bad, but rather I would hope (Kapor) and a lot of other
leaders in the computer-communications industry start looking at what is
privacy, what is an appropriate guarantee of free speech, but also the
right to be left alone, the right not to have their data under siege,'' he
said. ``We don't have a good sense of what our `bill of privacy rights'
are.''
Sherizen is trying to organize a forum on electronic free speech and
privacy issues with a university in the Boston area. He would like to hear
from anybody interested in participating, including members of the CU, and
can be reached by phone at (508) 653-7101 or on MCI Mail at SSherizen.
===========================================================================
To: decuac!comp-dcom-telecom@eecs.nwu.edu
From: Pat Bahn <pat@grebyn.com>
Subject: the Jolnet/Sun Devil story
Date: 21 Jun 90 15:04:13 GMT
I have a reporter friend who wants to do a story on the Jolnet/Sun Devil
situation. Is there anyone out there who has first hand experience. She
doesn't need friend of a friend rumours but hard physical contact. Guns in
faces of 12 year olds makes great copy.
thanks
=============================================================================
Pat @ grebyn.com | If the human mind was simple enough to understand,
301-948-8142 | We'd be too simple to understand it. -Emerson Pugh
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